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Errata
(mid-page) Should read, "if an alliance with that re­
gime seems stragegically necessary and 
economically desirable."
lk (first sentence, second paragraph) "As a matter of
tradition, the United States conducted 
its Spanish policy in conjunction with 
France and Great Britain"
18 (second-to-last line) "...that the best U.S. policy
would be one that kept Spain on the Anglo- 
American side of the Iron Curtain."
5? (second line) "practical concern so much as duty"
63 (Potter quote) "...other movements were intrinsically
at one with our own, despite local differ* 
ences of complexion.••"
70 (near bottom) "...for just a little too long in the
1 atv 19^0s and early 195Cs, and their re­
fusal to foist the Hitle? analogy upon
Stalin" etc.
82 (mid-pag*) "Though an attempt to banish Franco from
power, the United Nations resolution served 
only to increase his intransigence"
86 (note #17) MIn 19^5 he told a Madison Square Garden
Audience that in April of 1931," etc.
"Here I am preaching what I have learned the hard way. To express 
collective indignation may bring the glow of moral principles vin­
dicated without effort; but it is usually futile, and, more often 
than not, harmful. 1,1
■Dean Acheson 
Power and
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In 1945, Spain's Generalissimo Francisco Franco Bahamonde— 
soldier, patriot, Catholic zealot and dictator—was an international 
pariah without a single ally in the West. By 1950 he would become 
a belle to be courted by the United States Congress and military.
While in 1945 Franco was dismissed as a cowardly cohort of Mussolini 
and Hitler, four years later he was hailed in the same circles as a 
"very lovely and lovable character."* The man who had signed the 
Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan, Germany, and Ttnly in 1939 would 
twenty years later shake hands with President Eisenhower. No one need 
remind us that Francisco Franco was a survivor. Yet the story of his 
journey from international rejection to Western acceptance—and the 
United States' role in that turn of events—-is a subject which merits 
attention.
Indeed, the United States' Spanish policy largely determined 
the course of Franco's odyssey from international ostracism to Allied 
embrace, American idealism in the mld-1940s was partly responsible 
for Franco's diplomatic undoing. Wartime propaganda encouraged the 
American public to demand a Wilsonian peace in 1945, and few of the 
architects of that peace saw a place for Franco Spain—the shelter of 
the last earthly vestige of 1930s-style fascism—in the New World of 
democracy, self-determination, reconstruction and world organization. 
Similarly, when the exigencies of the Cold War replaced the hatreds of 
the World War, the United States found itself leading the way in wel­
coming Spain into the fold of anti-Communist allies,
The pages which follow seek not to tell Francisco Franco's tale 
so much as they attempt to describe and explain the American policy 
towardi Franco. Several scholars have recounted the history of
IAmerican relations with Fram «< Spain, vet few have examined In detail 
the I vT ip t I alee s which l ed \mcrlcan policy-makers to first repudiate 
and then embrace the Spanish dirt ,>or. In dissecting Spanish-Americat* 
relatIons an a particular and specialized set of diplomatic problems, 
many historians hav»* forgotten that the United States* policy in Spain 
lias more often than not reflected a broader American perspective of 
the wo r 1d .
The Htuiv of Spanish-Amerlean relations during the period be­
tween World War and Cold War provides an excellent case study of the 
United States* shifting priorities in its postwar relations with all 
of Europe, The problems which confronted the shapers of America*s 
Spanish policy became a part of the permanent repertoire of American 
foreign policy dilemmas, When, for example, should the United States 
press for democracy above all other considerations? And when should 
the internal character of a regime be disregarded, of an alliance 
with that regime seems strategically necessary and economically de­
sirable? The answers were not clear in the 1940s and they are not 
clear today, yet the fact that such questions continue to exist in­
dicates that the conflict between Idealism and realism in American 
thinking is an unending one.
To understand the general, however, we must first contemplate 
the specific. The first part of this study is concerned with the 
circumstances which brought Franco to the foreground of the United 
Nations' debate in 1946, as well as the Ideological setting which 
demanded his condemnation. Part Two describes the events which led 
up to the eventual policy reversal, with special emphasis upon the 
role of Congress and the military in initiating the policy change.
3The third and final chapter examines both the Wilsonian and the prag­
matic strands of the American diplomatic personality, and analyzes 
United States policy toward Franco Spain in the wider context of 
American economic, strategic, and political goals at the time.
As recent events continue to illustrate the growing influence of 
smaller nations upon the conduct of international relations, a study 
of Spain seems particularly warranted. Indeed, to investigate Spain's 
small role in postwar American policy ormulation is to remind our­
selves that the study of Cold War history Is much more than the study 
of U.S.-Soviet relations. ’ The following pages will attempt neither 
to excoriate or exonerate General Franco, nor will they decide whether 
his condemnation was morally Just iftable. What they will do Is look 
at Spanish policy as a microcosm of the American world view of the 
1940s, and suggest that the influences which guided policy-makers in 
that era are still a part of American diplomacy today.
Part One? The Condewnatfon
**Ha have »uch wore than an ordinary *r*rai responsibility in Spain. 
Our nilitary security, our p o lit ica l stability, and our economic 
well-being in the post-war world are ait intimately tied up to the 
(ate of Spain. Let Spain ewerg# from this war as a free* non- 
im perialistic, people*» republir ,  and both our aerurfty and our war 
kets to the South tri.il not he threatened.”'*
—-Congressman John M. Coffee 
(D-WanhJngton)
W S
MTha American leader# no longer found dictatorship abhorrent! they 
felt #v*jv»u?.*•/•> tor what hapP*n«d « M  over the world* They were 
gripped r.gain by messianic liberal law, the powerful urge to re for* 
the world tb it U  railed Wi lson I ani*m. They wanted a world both 
mtu for 'liberal, democracy »**d Uhorul capitalism,"''
—Daniel V irg in  
Shattered  Pearjt
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5The outcry against Franco had begun long before 1945, but as 
the war came to a close his detractors became increasingly vituperative. 
The Madison Capital Times echoed the sentiments of many in calling 
the C.eneralissimo a ’bloody dictator, protected by a wall of certified 
piety and the tanks of Hitler and Mussolini.” World opinion viewed 
Franco as the last legacy of Fascism, the final scourge to be eradicated 
from the European scene. His regime was seen as an anachronism in the 
New World of the victors, and as the Asheville (North Carolina) Dally 
Citizen complained, Franco spoke ’for a Spain of inquisitions and gal­
leons that Is out of place in the modern world.”? The New York Tiroes 
remarked that the regime was "a challenge to everything we fought for 
and an abomination to all who value freedom and democracy/' There 
could be no doubt, continued the Times, that "the world would be a bet­
ter place to live in if Franco were not in power. ” 8
The Allies’ Indignance with Franco had essentially two sources. 
First, he was a constant reminder to liberals everywhere of their de­
feat in the Spanish Civil War. Second, it was commonly believed that 
Franco owed his power to Hitler and Mussolini and had aided and abetted 
the Axis during World War II as evidence of his gratitude and sympathy 
for their cause. In March 1946, the State Department released German 
documents which gave seemingly damning evidence t»f Franco's solidarity 
with the Axis. He had written Mussolini in 1940, for example, prom­
ising his ’unconditional support for your expansion and your future/'*5 
He had assured his "dear Fuehrer” in 1941 that ” 1 stand ready at your 
side, entirely and decidedly at your disposal, united in a common his­
torical destiny, desertion from which would mean ray suicide." Franco 
believed, or so he wrote Hitler, "that the destiny of history has united
6you with myself and tlie Puce in an indissoluble way. " 10
Certainly the Caudillo, the Puce, and the Fuehrer made an unholy 
alliance, an evil triumverate who the Allied people loved to hate.
If Franco’s verbal expressions of sympathy were not enough to convince 
skeptics of his perfidy, there was also the fact that he had cosigned 
the Anti-Comintern Pact with Japan, Germany, and Italy. He had also 
ordered the Division Azul, a group of some 20,000 Spanish soldiers, to 
fight on the Soviet front and despite U.S, pressure to desist, Franco 
continued to authorize the sale of wolfram to Germany until as late as 
1944. It was widely believed that Franco had granted facilities to 
German intelligence in Spain, and that Spanish factories hummed with 
the production of armaments to be exported to the Axi , *!
When Franco shifted in 1942 from a policy of neutrality to one 
of "non-be1 Ligerancy," British and American diplomats worked feverishly 
to keep Spain from giving Germany carte blanche in the Iberian penin­
sula. Their efforts paid off; Franco in spite of his earlier leanings 
did nothing to prevent the Allied landing in North Africa in November 
1942. He even seemed pleased when in that same month President Roose­
velt wrote him a letter of thanks for his cooperation.1  ^ The American 
president assured Franco that "Spain has nothing to fear from the 
United Nations," and the closing lines were deferential: "I am, my
dear General, your sincere friend , . ," promised Roosevelt. 11
When the war ended three years later, however, these amenities 
were quickly forgotten. Spain had stayed out of the war officially, 
but public opinion had begun to believe that her flirtation with the 
Axis should not go unpunished. Roosevelt, with the Allies’ military 
success assured, could now write the American ambassador in Spain,
1Norman Armour, tint "Our victory over Germany will carry with it; the 
extermination of Nazi and .similar ideologies." And although it would 
not be the United States' province to Interfere with Spain's internal 
affairs, Roosevelt admitted that "1 should be lacking in candor . . . 
if l did not tell you that 1 can see no place in the community of na­
tions for governments founded on fascist principles."*
Roosevelt's remark was strong and unequivocal, and in making it 
he spoke for a broad sector of the American public. Just as the 
"Spanish hobby" would years later lead a crusade to bring Franco into 
the American sphere of influence, an organized group of anti-Franco 
liberals campaigned for his ostracism In 194‘>. Many of these antl- 
Francoists had opposed the dictator since the outbreak of the Spanish 
Civil War in 19'36, and were convinced that the end of World War II of­
fered a new opportunity to rid Spain of fascism forever.
Four tactors motivated the anti-Francoiwt group. First was their 
conviction that the United States had a moral responsibility to depose 
Franco—that the Second World War had been fought In order to wipe 
Hitler's brand of fascism from the face of the earth and that it must 
not continue to thrive in Spain. Many regarded the Spanish Civil War 
not as an irjigenous conflict but as the first phase of the World War, 
The United States' refusal to supply the Spanish Republicans had been 
a serious mistake, they believed, for it had given Hitler his first 
European victory in Spain. Representative John Coffee, the Democrat 
who led the ar.ti-Franco crusade in Congress, was one of many liberals 
who felt a personal responsibility to "erase the crime" of Spain.
"We showered all of the blame for the Spanish tragedy on the appeasers," 
Coffee remarked In 1945. "What a convenient and easy way this was to
8absolve oorselves for our own sins. " 1
To eradicate Francoism would also be to deprive Nazi refugees of 
a shelter In Spain at the war’s end, and this was a second tenet of 
anti-Francoism. A real fear existed among American liberals that 
Franco'8 continuance In power would keep fascism alive and ready to be 
rekindled in Europe. A third contention of the anti-Franco forces was 
that fascism, if left alone In Spain, would spread to Latin America, 
destroying American markets and security and possibly engendering a 
third world war in the Western Hemisphere. Finally, the group was con­
vinced that unless democracy was restored to Spain, the United States 
would lose the Spanish market for American goods.
The anti-Francoists advocated the use of international moral 
pressure to expel Franco, but also believed that such pressure must be 
accompanied by financial and military aid to the Republican rebels of 
the Spanish "underground." Their goal was to create a liberal demo­
cratic government, but not a monarchy, to replace General Franco. 17 
Coffee hi- >‘11 thought that the best plan would be for the Allies to 
arm Spanish rebels and let them do their own fighting against Franco.
In January 1945 he submitted H.R. 100 to the House of Representatives, 
which called for an end to American diplomatic recognition of Spain and 
proposed that as a "minimum program," Congress should appoint a mili­
tary commission to send
arms, ammunition, and medical supplies to the 
heroic republican guerilla armies of Spain when 
their revolt, timed to weaken the Nazi armies 
in the moment of greatest crisis, creates in 
Spain one of the active and decisive battlefields 
of this global war.1B
9Among the endorsers of H.R. 100 was the American Committee for 
Spanish Freedom, which had been organized in the autumn of 1944 for the 
purpose of "coordinating, developing, and clarifying sentiment In the 
United States with respect to the present government in Spain. " 1 **
The Committee boasted a long list of prestigious members, many of whom 
were prominent artists, writers, scientists, and educators. The 
group’s first activity was to issue a statement which approved H.R. 100 
and warned that "the great war in which we are now engaged will have 
been in vain if German fascism is permitted to exist anywhere when 
this war ends." The endorsement demanded an end to U.S. recognition 
or the Franco regime? and a beginning of American assistance to the Re­
publican forces in Spain. Leonard Bernstein, Bennet Cert, Aaron Cop­
land, Ira Gershwin, Lillian Heilman and Max Weber were among the signa­
tories,'' but this is not to say that the anti-Francoists were no more 
than an elite group of American intellectuals. Eighteen thousand 
Americans attended a January 1945 rally at New York's Madison Square 
Garden to protest Franco's continuance in power, and demanded an 
American condemnation of the regime. The gathering was sponsored by 
the Nation Associates (the publishers of the Nation), but also by as­
sorted civic, political, and labor organizations. ' ' 1
Coffee did not really exaggerate when he claimed that H.R. 100 
responded to a "feeling entertained by millions of Americans, that ov,r 
appeasement of fascism anywhere should no longer be tolerated;"'' in­
deed, his words echoed those of some of the more famous liberals of 
the day. As early as 1942, Vice President Henry Wallace had stated 
that just as in 1862 the United States could not remain half slave and 
half free, "so in 1942 the world must make its decision for a complete
10
victory one way or the other."• j Wallace believed that a military vic­
tory over the Nazis was not enough—he wished to build a new world 
which would be economically, politically, and spiritually sound. ^
In 1947, Wallace wrote Secretary of State George Marshall that
what we need Is a mobile offensive In our foreign 
policy, an affirmation of the revolutionary tra­
dition out of which this country was born, a loud 
and ringing 'yes* to the change that the wrecked 
societies of Europe and Asia are demanding at once.'
Although by this time Wallace’s influence in foreign-policy formulation 
had waned, he still spoke for many Americans when he urged Marshall 
that ”we must act to implement the Atlantic Charter; we must help the 
colonial peoples in their struggle to free themselves; we must lead 
rather than follow In opposition to such men as Franco.” Wallace con­
sidered American leadership crucial in the postwar world, and feared 
that if the United States did not respond to the needs of the hungry 
and oppressed across the globe, they would turn to the Soviet Union for 
support. ”We must seek everywhere to find out what changes are needed 
in the devastated areas of the world to fill the stomachs and make 
busy the hands of the people;" Wallace proclaimed, "and we must be the 
first to sponsor them.”/r'
Obviously there was no place for Franco In a world which was to 
be based upon the ideals of the Atlantic Charter. The New York Times 
zealously supported a condemnation of Spain; a typical editorial would 
praise the latest international denunciation of Franco and at firm that 
his end was only a matter of time. "Though the Franco regime may pro­
test against this world judgment and attempt to defy it/’ the Times
rejoiced, ’there can be little doubt that the unanimous verdict is
11
sapping its moral strength and crumbling the props on which it rests. ” 2 1 
Such rhetoric encouraged many Americans to believe that the sacrifices 
of the World War had been too great to allow any ’compromise with Satan” 
at the conflict’s end.' 8 Thus it Is not surprising that by 1945, the 
Allied public generally shared the Times opinion that Franco and his 
sycophants must be brought to their knees. By isolating Spain and 
making Franco the target of International derision, the Allies hoped in 
the months ahead to replace the regime with a moderate, democratic 
state consistent with the rest of the West. The stage was set for a 
worldwide condemnation of the Spanish regime and of all that it was 
believed to stand for. The "noche negra”—the black night—of Francoism 
had begun.
★ * * •k
One of the first official manifestations of the "free world’s” 
disgust with Franco came in June 1945, at the San Francisco Conference 
of the United Nations. Ihe question of U.N. membership caused squab­
bles first in the case of Argentina, whose government had also been 
denounced for its fascist leanings and overly enthusiastic support of 
the Axis powers during World War II. Argentina had been the only na­
tion in the Western Hemisphere which had refused to sever its ties with 
Nazi Germany during the course of the war—and Its regime had seemed
12
almost defiant of the American plea for continental solidarity,'’ But 
several months prior to the Conference, the U.S, had exacted an Argen­
tine promise to liberalize its regime and cooperate in a common future 
policy of American nations, in exchange for an American vow to assure 
Argentina's membership in the United Nations. Stalin's vehement protest 
of the Argentine petition for membership was quickly overruled at San 
Francisco, when the United States Joined with twenty other American 
republics to push through Argentina's inclusion.
Franco, on the other hand, was to have no such luck. Tf the 
conference revealed that there were embarrassingly irreconcilable 
differences between the Soviets and the West, it also provided a re­
commendation upon which the two sides could agree—that Spain must be 
excluded from the U.N, and its agencies. The conference also considered 
the possibility of breaking economic and diplomatic relations with 
Spain, and agreed in principle to take military action should Franco's 
regime become a threat to the peace,
The next step came soon after, at Potsdam. Certainly the repre­
sentatives of the BL(1 Three* had more pressing worries than the fate of 
Franco Spain; nonetheless the question surfaced several times in dis­
cussion. Stalin was adamant, for example, that both diplomatic and 
economic relations with Spain be severed. He insisted that the Franco 
regime had been imposed upon Spain b,r the Axis, and he urged its de­
struction. "I am not proposing that we unleash a civil war there," 
the Soviet leader explained, "l should only like the Spanish people 
to know that we, the leaders of democratic Europe, take a negative atti­
tude to the Franco regime." The Allies could demonstrate their dis­
approval, said Stalin, by recognizing the Republican government-in-exile
na si the only legitimate representative of the Spanish people, and by 
authorizing the Security Council to plan possible military intervention 
against Franco.
Churchill and Truman were less zealous, however. The British 
leader remarked that "considering that the Spaniards are proud and 
rather sensitive, such a step hv its very nature could have the effect 
of uniting the Spaniards around Franco, instead of making them move 
away from him." Truman, though he made no secret of his own antipathy 
toward the Spanish leader, was also reluctant to come down too hard.
"We should be very glad to recognize another government in Spain in­
stead of the Franco government," he began cautiously, "but that I think 
is a question for Spain herself to decide."'0
The discussion of the Spanish question at Potsdam revealed one 
of the chronic dilemmas of postwar foreign policy-making—whether it 
was wise, in Churchill's words, to "interfere in the internal affairs 
of a state with whom we differ In views."'1 Charles Mee has written 
that the Spanish conversations were "at the very least . . .  a test 
of British and American honesty about their desire to see democratic 
governments in Europe,"'' yet it can be argued that the Anglo-American 
wish for Spanish democracy was very real—but uncertainty as to what 
was the best means toward the desired end led to hesitation and inde­
cision. In any event, after "relentless bickering," the three leaders 
finally agreed to a compromise solution. They issued a declaration 
which expressed their opposition to
any application for membership to the United 
Nations put forward by the present Spanish Gov­
ernment, which, having been founded with the 
support of the Axis Powers, does not, in view of
14
its origins, its nature, its record and its 
close association with the aggressor States, 
possess the qualifications necessary to Justi­
fy such membership.^
According to Mee, this declaration, though "presentable and 
mearingless," was nonetheless a victory for the Anglo-Americans, who 
had successf,jUy refused to accede to Stalin's pressure for harsher 
action. The triumph was temporary, however, for the Spanish question 
would continue to be a point of perpetual disagreement. No one liked 
Spain's "fat little dictator," yet no one could decide what to do about 
him.
* * * *
As a matter of tradition, the United States continued its Span­
ish policy in conjunction with France and Great Britain; between 
August 1945 and November 1946 the three governments consulted with each 
other at virtually every step. Unanimous was the opinion that Spain 
should have a democratic government, "based on democratic principles, 
moderate in tendency, stable. . . The three powers were divided, 
however, as to how their objective could be attained.
In 1945, Assistant Secretary of State James Dunn asserted that 
the United States would only consider a rupture of diplomatic relations 
with Spain "provided the French and British Governments were inclined
15
to adopt that course.m3j Yet the British especially feared that a 
consideration of the Spanish question in the United Nations, for exam­
ple, would be construed as interference in the Internal affairs of a 
sovereign nation. In an aide-memoire to the American State Department, 
the British expressed concern that "a dangerous precedent would be 
set*’ if the issue of Spain were brought before the Security Council.
If a foreign country "could be arraigned before the Security Council 
solely because th^ form of its regime was distasteful to one or more 
foreign governments, it is not possible to surmise what might happen in 
the future," the memoire warned. 38 The British opposed a diplomatic 
break with Franco on the grounds that the Spanish people, ever-proud, 
would rally around their leader in the face of International condemna­
tion. The French, on the other hand, had supported a break since 1945, 
and urged a tripartite effort to dethrone General Franco. 37
The sine qua non of American policy can be summarized in a word- 
evolution. Throughout 1945 and 1946, American diplomats desired neither 
to eject Franco forcibly nor to adhere to strict non-interference. As 
Ambassador Armour told Franco in 1945, "we had hoped to see an evolu­
tion in the government . . .  in line with the trend of events and the 
new spirit abroad in the world; an evolution that would enable Spain to 
occupy the role that properly belonged to it in the postwar world. " 38 
It was hoped that Franco, under pressure from the West, would "loosen" 
and "liberalize" his regime, gradually restoring civil liberties to 
the Spanish citizenry. Later that year, Armour even envisioned that 
Franco might "hand back the power to the generals from whom he had ori­
ginally received it." Democracy could be restored "if those in turn 
were to call in some outstanding civilians and together work out a
16
form ot constitution, to be submitted to plebiscite. " 11
The call for evolution was echoed by Dean Acheson, then Under­
secretary of State to James Byrnes. It seemed that both Armour and 
Acheson believed that if Liberal democracy were to Infect Western Europe 
in 1945, with any luck U  might be contagious in Spain. Acheson him­
self made a distinction (as did most of his colleagues) between the 
Spanish government—a corrupt dictatorship—and the Spanish people who, 
longing for freedom, could be convinced to rebel against their oppressor.
Both Byrnes and Acheson favored the idea of a three-power state­
ment which would urge the Spanish people to take charge of their national 
government. 1+0 By March 1946 such a declaration had been Issued, in 
which the United States with France and Britain expressed their hope 
that
leading patriotic and liberal-minded Spaniards may 
soon find means to bring about a peaceful withdrawal 
of Franco, the abolition of the Falange, and the 
establishment of an interim or caretaker government 
under which the Spanish people may have an oppor­
tunity freely to determine the type of government 
they wish to have and choose their leaders. 1*1
When evidence existed that the as yet unborn interim government had 
also restored civil liberties, granted political amnesty, and returned 
exiled Spaniards, the declaration continued, Spain "should receive 
the recognition and support of all freedom-loving peoples."*4^
Emmet Hughes has written of the tripartite declaration that "as 
an expression of beatific intentions, this statement was impeccable.
As a declaration of policy, its principal flaw was that it made no 
sense. " 1*3 Indeed, the three powers had hedged on the issue of main­
tenance of diplomatic ties with Franco, calling it "a matter to be
17
decided In the light of events and after taking Into account the ufo;cs 
of the Spanish people to achieve their own freedom. ,*4<* In other words, 
the people of Spain were to realize that the proverbial ball was in 
their court, and must take the initiative in changing their government.
How they were to do so was a detail left unmentioned*
Within a month, the issue would come to the whole world's atten­
tion. Oscar Lange, the Polish delegate at the United Nations, addressed 
the Security Council or. April 17 with a resolution calling for both 
the severance of relations with the Franco regime and a declaration that 
its activities constituted a threat to international peace and security. 
Lange contended that the U.N. had not only the right but the duty to 
take up the Spanish question. "Let us not repeat th* mistakes of appease­
ment," he urged his colleagues in all-too-iamiliar language. "I appeal 
to you in the name of 23 million Poles who , . , have suffered death 
and torture at the hands of the Nazis whom Franco has helped."4*^
Lange purported that the existence of the Franco government en­
dangered international security for a host of reasons. He claimed 
that "tens of thousands" of Nazi war criminals had taken refuge in Spain, 
and that two thousand former Gestapo agents had been absorbed into 
Franco’s secret police. Further, said Lange, German scientists and 
engineers were at work in the Spanish armaments industry, perhaps con­
structing an atomic uurab that would reverse the Nazi defeat. Spain 
was "the center of propaganda and dissemination of the dangerous Fascist 
ideas which have led to war," warned Tange. Franco had been an Axis 
partner in World War 11, and should not only be punished but eliminated. 446
None of Lange's contentions was universally accepted by the U.N.; 
his tirade did, however, force every nation to take t stand on the
18
Spanish question. The United States found Itself in a particularly dif­
ficult position. The State Department was against severing diplomatic 
ties, yet it would be dangerous both internationally and domestically 
to give the Poles and the Soviets a monopoly on moral Indignation. 
American policy-makers did not consider the Franco regime a threat to 
the peace, but opposition to the Lange resolution was not consistent 
with the postwar American commitment to press for democracy in all of 
Europe.
Carefully, a policy was hammered out. united States delegate Ed­
ward Stettlnius received instructions from Byrnes that while it was 
the United States* ultimate goal to eliminate Franco, it was not in 
American interests to bring the matter before the Security Council,
The Soviets would benefit most from a discussion of the Spanish ques­
tion, Byrnes intimated, which would "meet their keen desire to press 
for international interference in the Spanish situation in the hope 
that during the resulting confusion a new regime will emerge which will 
be more satisfactory to Soviet ambitions."
Thus as early as April 1946, Spanish policy had been touched by 
a Cold War rationale; the State Department had examined Franco Spain 
not only on its own merit but as a part of the wider East-West rivalry. 1*7 
Only a month earlier Churchill had declared that "from Stettin in the 
Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across 
the Continent," and Stalin's angrily defensive response seemed to further 
widen the gap between Eastern and Western Europe.Although Franco's 
government was still undesirable to most American diplomats, it ap­
peared that the best U,S. polir would be one that kept Stalin on the 
Anglo-American side of the Iron Curtain. Byrnes counseled Stettlnius
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to ask the Security Council to form a subcommittee to monitor the 
Spanish quest Jon, and he advised the delegation to vote against any 
resolution n quI *ing diplomatic or economic sanctions against Spain.
On April 29, 1946, the Security Council did create a subcommittee 
to investig.ite the Spanish question, and on dune 1 of that same year 
it presented its ambiguous conclusions. Agreeing that the Franco re­
gime's activities were a potential menace to the peace, it empowered 
the Security Council to "recommend appropriate procedures or methods of 
adjustment in order to improve the situation." The committee advised 
that unless Franco stepped down and political liberties were assured, 
the member nations should withdraw their ambassadors from Spain. If 
democratic Institut ons wevc restored, the U.N. could consider favor­
ably any Spanish petition for membership. 4*9
Essentially the report solved nothing, it was f^r too mild to be 
accepted by Lange's supporters and far too vague to have any practical 
impact. It did, however, set the scene for the final showdown of De­
cember 1946, which would result in the withdrawal of ambassadors. Be­
fore that confrontation is described, it would be useful to discuss 
the basis for Lange's accusations. Was the Franco regime "fascist?"
Hud Spain really been an Axis accomplice in World War II?
* * * *
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The immediacy of the Axis defeat made the debate of such questions 
an emotional one. In retrospect, however, it can be seen that the at­
tack on Franco was based not so much upon fact as upon feeling, and a 
pervasive belief that his government was an anomaly in the postwar world.
Contemporary historians basically agree that the term "fascist,” 
though popularly used to describe Franco*s regime, is a misnomer* "In 
spite of the Fascist trimmings of the early years—the goose-step and 
the Fascist salute—Francoism was not a totalitarian regime," writes 
Raymond Carr. "It was a conservative, Catholic, authoritarian system, 
its original corporatist features modified over time.1* According to 
Carr, the regime lacked most of the characteristics of a totalitarian 
state, for it made few attempts at mass mobilization and supported no 
single party. Franco's government "rested on the apathy of the public, 
the partial satisfaction of the pressure groups within the regime, and 
the systematic exclusion from power of those who did not accept the 
Principles of the Movement," adds Carr. b0
The real pillars of Francoism were the army, the Church, and the 
conservative monarchists of the administration, in addition, the cold 
hard fact that Franco's side had won the Spanish Civil War gave the 
dictator what he considered the moral justification for and legal basis 
of his power. Furthermore the Falange Party, most closely associated 
with fascist Ideology, was being phased out of power by 1938. "What 
Hitler called 'the clerical monarchical scum' was already floating to 
the top," claims Carr. In 1942, only 40 of the 106 members of Franco's 
National Council were members of the Falangist Party. bl
Max Gallo has suggested that Franco was regarded as a fascist 
essentially because his rule coincided chronologically with the rise
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of Hitler and Mussolini. But Gallo calls Francoism a "reactionary move­
ment o f  the olassia type, expressing the interests of a ll the traditionally 
dominant strata. Similarly, the Franco regime's activity during 
World War II can be explained as an attempt by the dominant strata—
Franco and his ministers—to preserve Spain's political independence of 
action as well as serve the national interest.
Undeniably, the Franco government made overtures between 1940 and 
1942 that revealed its ideological sympathy with the Axis powers. Fran- 
co and Hitler met at Hendaye in 1940 to discuss the feasibility of 
’Operation Felix," a plan that would have allowed the German army to 
pass through Spain in order to seize control of Gibraltar. Four months 
later at Bordlghera, Franco and Mussolini exchanged pleasantries. Yet 
scholars have agreed that Franco's entry into the war would have come 
only at a high price to the Axis. The Generalissimo demanded food, 
grain, and war materiel as compensation for Spain's entry, as well as 
a promise that Spain would receive Morocco as one of the spoils at the 
war's end. "Spain is to promise to Germany, in return, her friendship," 
pledged the Caudillo. ^ 3
As long as it was not in Spain's Interests to enter the war,
Franco avoided commitments. While it is true that Spain supplied the 
Third Reich with valuable wolfram and a "Blue Division" of fighting men, 
Franco's cooperation with the Axis was essentially only verbal. Franco 
assured Hitler of his "unchangeable and sincere adherence to you per­
sonally, to the German people and to the cause for which you fight," 
but he never gave Hitler an explicit promise of collaboration.What 
many Americans failed to realize at the time was that the Spain of the 
early 1940s had been utterly devastated by its own civil war, and
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doubtlessly would have found survival difficult if it had participated 
in a second conflict. While nations like Argentina, Sweden, and Switzer­
land had also contributed considerable moral and material support to 
the German war effort, only Spain was continuously harangued for her 
violation of wartime neutrality. The Allies accused Franco of being 
pro-German, when in fact he was pro-Spanish, courting both Axis and 
Allied diplomats in an effort to protect his country’s best interests.v
indeed, by the time the Allies invaded North Africa Franco had be­
gun to hedge on his commitment to the Axis.M His energies, wrote 
Arthur Whitaker, ’were to be devoted almost impartially to working both 
sides oi the street while keeping Spain untouched by the war."5/ An 
Important signal of Franco’s desire for rapprochement with the Allies 
was the appointment of the pro-British Francisco Gomez Jordana as foreign 
minister. The Blue Division was recalled in November 1943, and by the 
summer of 1944 Franco’s attitude toward the Allies had ’evolved rapidly 
and favorably. 8 By 1944 Franco had also replaced the pictures of Hit­
ler and Mussolini that hung on his office wall with a simple rendering 
of the Pope. The next year, Spain severed its relations with Japan.
Franco's success in keeping Spain out of the war has been both 
lauded as a "difficult exercise in brinkmanship" and disdained as an 
embar isslngly obvious attempt to "vestirse de la moda"—to dress In 
the fashion—of whichever side appeared to be winning the war. 5 j If the 
Generalissimo’s goal was to protect Spain from further bloodshed, he 
succeeded—but he failed to convince the victorious Allies that he had 
acted in self-defense. Juan Cardenas, the Spanish ambassador to the 
United States, wrote Byrnes in 1946 that "any action favorable to the 
Axis powers by Spain was taken in self-defense in order to prevent an
-j
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Axis Invasion . . .  on the other hand action taken favorable to the 
United Nations was prompted by a friendly feeling towards them."
Carlton Hayes, the wartime American ambassador to Spain, agreed in his 
memoirs that the Spanish had contributed considerably to the Allied 
victory in the final years of the war.fi
Their cries for moderation in dealing with Spain were generally 
ignored. When Franco tried in 1945 to give his regime a more liberal 
appearance (he filled the Cabinet with monarchists and promulgated a 
Spanish "bill of rights"), his efforts were scorned as desperate, elev­
enth-hour attempts to appease the West. When the Spanish issue came 
to a head in late 1946, the United Nations revealed that they were net- 
thc?r willing to forgive or forget.
* it * *
If the 1946 Spanish resolution was indicative of the goals of the 
new internationalism, it was fitting that two of the Senate's most fa­
mous internationalists—Texas Democrat Tom Connally and Michigan Repub­
lican Arthur Vandenberg—should present U.S, policy on Spain. Vanden- 
berg especially was a ubiquitous American voice in foreign policy mat­
ters, and if his opinion was not always respected, it was invariably 
heard. As the United States' delegates to the General Assembly, he and 
Connally were catapulted into the thick of the Spanish debate. They
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were not unprepared, for the State Department had armed them with a policy. 
The way they articulated it, however, was uniquely their own.
Vandenberg himself had drafted the official U.S. policy statement 
on Spain in November 1946. Essentially the statement reaffirmed old 
ideas—the condemnation of Franco, the hope for the democratization of 
Spain, the opposition to Spanish membership in the United Nations—and 
pledged to support the Security Council "in any action it takes against 
the Franco regime . . .  if and when the Security Council finds that the 
regime is a threat to international peace and security." Pending such 
a finding, however, Vandenberg warned that the United States would op­
pose intervention, believing that it would unite the Spanish people 
against outside interference and "precipitate the Spanish people them­
selves into the disaster of civil war with unknown but inevitably costly 
consequences.
Connally a month earlier had used almost exactly the same words 
in a speech to the U.N. Political and Security Committee; like Vanden­
berg he initially used scripts provided by the State Department when it 
came to Spanish p o l i c y . ' B y  December, however, Connally’s rhetoric 
began to take on a Wilsonian toi e and emphasis; he did not abandon his 
Washington guidelines but he amplified them considerably. The "Connally 
resolution" for Spain, submitted to the U.N. on December 2, was an ex­
pression both of American policy and American prejudices. It said that 
as long as Franco remained in power, Spain would not be admitted to the 
United Nations. But what merits examination here is Connally’s elab­
oration on this point, his choice of language and his perception of the 
situation in Spain.
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The Connolly resolution began with the United Nations* assurance 
of their ''enduring sympathy" for the people of Spain and "the cordial 
welcome awaiting them when circumstances enable them to be admitted 
to the United Nations." Until this happy day, however, the Spanish 
people would have their work cut out for them. Because their govern­
ment was "Fascist," because it had been imposed upon them by force and 
thus did not represent them, the Spanish people could not enjoy member­
ship in the United Nations and its agencies. The General Assembly 
recognized that it was "for the Spanish people to settle the form of 
their government." Thus, went the Connally resolution,
in the interest of Spain and of world cooperation 
the people of Spain should give proof to the world 
that they have a government which derives its au­
thority from the consent of the governed; and that 
to achieve that end General Franco should surrender 
the powers of Government to a provisional government 
broadly representative of the Spanish people, com­
mitted to respect freedom of speech, religion, and 
assembly and to the prompt holding of an election 
in which the Spanish people, free from force and in­
timidation and regardless of party, may express 
their will/1*
This was Connally's answer to the Lange proposal. The Polish 
and the Soviets might clamor for a diplomatic break with Spain, but 
the United States would show magnanimity and give the Spanish people 
a chance to prove that they really deserved to Join the United Nations. 
Connally followed the presentation of his resolution the next day, 
with a widely publicized speech that rejected the call for collective 
action against Spain. According to Gonna! y, "the restoration of the 
Government of Spain to the Spanish people cannot be achieved through 
action . . . involving pressure." Diplomatic and economic sanctions
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would '’almost certainly produce economic and political chaos in that 
country . . . [and] would undoubtedly lead to widespread civil strife. ' 1 
The solution, said Connally, was to "banish" the Franco regime trom 
the U.N. "until an a ceptable government is formed by the people of 
Spain. "f,f>
in both resolution and speech, Connally had stated what was to be 
accomplished in Spain; how the conversicr was to take place was still 
not clear. The Senator simply said that he was "confident" that "the 
democratic ideals of the Spanish peovile will reassert themselves to 
create the foundation of a stable government." He constantly assured 
ail concerned that the United States was still "fully committed to the 
fundamental principle of non-intervention.
Thua by December 5 the Political and Security Committee found it­
self with two drastically different resolutions. The American resolu­
tion asked the Spanish people to make themselves eligible for U.N. mem­
bership; the Polish proposal demanded that all U.N. members withdraw 
ambassadors from Spain. In addition tha Committee had to consider 
eight different amendments to the Polish and American resolutions.
There seemed no alternative but to hand the matter over to a sub­
committee; this was done and within three days the subcommittee had 
produced a draft which was an amalgam of all the proposals, amendments, 
and resolutions submitted in the past. In spite of Connally1s heated 
protestations, the draft recommended severing diplomatic ties with 
Spain. Twenty-three nations voted to adopt the subcommittee's draft, 
four voted against it, and twenty, including the United States, abstained.
The draft thus became a resolution, and in its final form greatly 
resembled the Connally proposal. However, the last two paragraphs,
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borrowed from a Belgian amendment, were different in a major respect. 
The recommendation was that
if within a reasonable time there is not estab­
lished a government which derives its authority 
from the consent of the governed . . . the Se­
curity Council consider the adequate measures to 
be taken in order to remedy the situation and;
Recommend that all members of the United Na­
tions immediately recall from Madrid their Ambas­
sadors and Ministers Plenipotentiary accredited 
there. /
On December 13 and after twelve hours of debate, the General 
Assembly voted on the compromise resolution. The final tally was thirty- 
four nations in favor, six opposed, and thirteen abstaining. The diplo­
matic isolation of Spain was a fait accompli. By the end of th» year 
only Portugal and the Vatican would have ambassadors in Madrid, and the 
American presence In Spain was limited to a staff of embassy "charges,” 
who kept in touch with Washington but shunned the advances of Spanish 
officials.
The United States, surprisingly, was among the nations voting in 
favor of this final resolution. Dean Acheson's telegram to the American 
charge d'affaires in Spain, Philip Bonsai, gives the most lucid explana­
tion of the American delegation's apparent reversal. Although Acheson 
would have preferred the Connally resolution by itself and believed "it 
would have been more effective in accomplishing peaceful removal of 
Franco [sic]," he felt that
in interest harmony and closest possible unanimity 
in GA on Spanish problem US will vote for resolution 
as whole with earnest hope peaceful change contem­
plated will soon bring freedom to Spanish people. b8
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The State Department had counseled a "yes" vote in the Interest of unity, 
but another motive was their belief that an American veto would be per­
ceived as pro-Franco and would thus fuel the fires of hungry Soviet 
propagandists/ 3 In the nascent U.N. organization, the appearance of 
unanimity was imperative, and it seemed wiser to acquiesce on the Span­
ish question and save American energies for the battles ahead. The 
Franco issue had become confused, overinfiated, and extremely emotional, 
and after all, then* were bigger fish to fry in the Europe of 1947.
* * * *
The resolution of 1946 was an attempt to close the door on the 
Spanish problem, yet it seemed to suggest more questions that it an­
swered. What, for example, was the resolution meant to accomplish?
Was it seen as a me/*ns to force Franco out or as an end in itself—a 
way to punish an unrepentant regime for the crimes of its past? Would 
the diplomatic sanctions lead to further U.N. action? And if the U.N. 
were truly bound to a policy of non-interference, did it actually ex­
pect the Spanish people to oust Franco without outside help?
Such questions, though justified, were not to be answered in the 
General Assembly. Both the Spaniards and the New York Times agreed 
that the U.N. subcommittee had "made a policy where they should have 
made an investigation. " 70 The final resolution was not a clearcut
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statement of unanimous purpose, hut a hybrid of a half-dozen conflicting 
and incompatible proposals, combined not to insure continuity but to 
allow compromise. Nearly everyone involved in the proceedings admitted 
that the resolution was ultimately voted on because the debate was 
leading nowhere. The Spanish issue was being argued with a fervency 
that was disproportionate to its intrinsic importance, and the whole 
subject had become ‘'confused and unrealistic. ' 1 ' 1
Such questions also suggest that the United Nations resolution on 
Spain constituted a serious discrepancy between words and actions, be­
tween idealistic hopes for the Spanish people and reasonable expectations 
for Spain. The United States' role In the condemnation of Spain must 
also be examined. Were Americans realistic in demanding that Spain "de­
mocratize" and "liberalize"? What made them believe that Franco would 
step down? Finally, what political biases and ideological traditions did 
the Connally resolution reflect?
On its own, the Connally resolution seems utopian to an extreme.
It stated, for example, that the Franco government had been imposed upon 
the Spanish people by force—and simultaneously insisted that tnese 
same people "settle the form of their government" and "give proof to 
the world that they have a government which derives its authority from 
the consent of the governed." Its suggestion that General Franco "sur­
render the powers cf Government to a provisional government broadly 
representative of the Spanish people" must have seemed ludicrous to 
people living In Spain at the time. Nonetheless, the Connally reso­
lution followed a long line of similar pronouncements—from Wilson's 
Fourteen Points to FDR's Atlantic Charter and the Yalta Declaration on 
Liberated Europe. The Atlantic Charter reflected an idea that was
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paramount to American war aims—"the right of all peoples to choose the 
form of government under which they will live," It spoke of a desire 
to "see sovereign rights and self government restored to those who have 
been forcibly deprived of them. " ;7 The Yalta Declaration called for 
the extermination of fascist ideologies and the creation of democratic 
institutions in all oi Europe. It promised to assist all liberated 
peoples in forming "interim governmental authorities broadly representa­
tive of all democratic elements In the population and pledged to the 
earliest possible establishment of governments responsive to the will of 
the people."7* Although Byrnes would contend that the Yalta Declaration 
was Intended not for Spain but for Eastern Europe, its language and ob­
jectives mirrored those of the Connally resolution. 7
Self-determination was an American goal both in war and in peace.
In his Navy Day speech of October 1945, Truman reiterated that it was a 
"fundamental" of American foreign policy to want sovereign rights and self- 
government to be returned to any nations that had been deprived of them.
He spoke of his hope to attain "a world in which Nazism, Fascism, and 
military aggression cannot exist. " 75 His words were seized upon by 
phrase-makers like Connally and Vandenberg who saw the Atlantic Charter 
as the heart and soul of American postwar policy. 76
The Connally resolution had a number of precedents in its emphasis 
on Spanish self-government. A more striking phenomenon, however, was 
the widespread conviction that self-government would "evolve" in Spain, 
that if her citizens wanted a change then an authoritarian government 
should be no obstacle. This concept, too, had a history. Throughout 
the Second World War, for example, Americans expressed a peculiar hope 
that an evolution and improvement of internal conditions might lead
nthe Soviet Union towards liberalization.7' Another prevalent idea was 
that the spirit of international cooperation might infect domestic
affairs as well.
The Spanish Republicans in exile were among those responsible for 
feeding the Allies1 hopes that democracy could be restored to Spain 
relatively easily. Former Republican ministers toured the United States 
and Britain throughout the 1940s lecturing and lobbying to rally the 
opposition against Franco, In 1945, Pablo Azcarate, the former ambassa­
dor to London, told an Oxford University audience that Franco’s "personal 
regime" should be Immediately abolished. He expressed his confidence that
anybody, a man, a group of men, a political party, 
a coalition, ready to get this thing done with 
speed and determination, would receive such an 
overwhelming support from the whole nation that 
any opposition coming from no matter what minority 
groups would be hopeless, and would fall if at­
tempted. 78
During February of 1946, Jose Glral met with Acheson to discuss the 
possibility of setting up a new Republican government in Spain.
Glral, the president of the Republic-in-exile, was long a proponent 
of breaking diplomatic relations with Franco. He often Insinuated that 
if the United States refused to support his opposition government,
"the Glral ministry would find itself forced to enter into negotiations 
with the Conano’ists in order that it might receive the support of So­
viet Russia for its activities."79
Threats like these generally hurt the Republicans more than any­
thing, for they seemed to give credence to Franco's claim that the 
Republican exiles were merely Soviet dupes, enemies of the "true" Spain 
of order and decency. Franco tended to view the international outcry
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against his regime as a temporary phenomenon, and predicted in his reply 
to the Potsdam Declaration that '’once the passions inflamed by war and 
propaganda have died down, the injustices of the moment will be redree:'*d." 
He considered Oscar Lange to be the "Warsaw mouthpiece of the Politburo," 
and dismissed Lange's allegations against Spain as "a brazen attempt t« 
intervene in the domestic affairs of a sovereign nation.
It would be fatuous to believe that Franco's ostracism was the re­
sult of an international communist conspiracy as the dictator himself 
all d. In 1945 the Western democracies were both anti-fascist and 
anti-communist, and the desire to "do something" about Franco grew out 
of public sentiment as much as private plotting. Equally inaccurate 
were claims that the Soviet vilification of Franco was part of a larger 
plan to establish a communist government in Spain. Oorge F. Kennan 
wired Byrnes in 1946 that "there is still a vast psychological abyss 
between fierce personal pride of Iberian character and total personal 
sublimlnation oi modern eastern Slav. Until something is done to bridge 
this void, I doubt the Russians can ever seize and hold the leadership 
they covet in Iberian affairs. " 81 The Soviets reviled Franco not just 
out of sympathy for the Republican Left, but also because he had ordered 
the Blue Division to Russia where it had Inflicted considerable damage.
It must be noted, however, that much of Franco's criticism of 
the United Nations' condemnation was justified. There was a great deal 
of truth to his charge that the U.N. violated its own charter by barring 
Spain from participation in the proceedings which affected her.8* The 
regime considered it "absurd that the accused be judged by any Inter­
national organization of which it is not a part, before which it does 
not appear and by which it is not summoned."81* Franco further observed
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that the power** had almost unanimously recognized the legitimacy of 
hi# government In 19^, with no .ru ntion of its ’’Fascist origins” or 
"unrepresenita? iv**” nature. His wrst compelling argument against the 
condemnation of Spain and the withdrawal of ambassadors was that the 
U.N.’s actions were capricious. It seemed farcical to Franco that the 
Soviet Union, far from being a democracy itself, could bar Spain from 
the U.N. because of Franco’s "totalitarian” regime. Artajo, the Span­
ish foreign minister, would remark that ’there was considerably more 
personal liberty in Spain” than in the Soviet Union and its satellites. 
It seemed to Artajo that the U.N. was no more than a victor's club, 
conducting its business by and for the benefit of the nations who had 
won the war.8'-
The most serious deficiency of both the Connally resolution and 
the U.N. resolution of 1946 is quite simply this—that they were not 
realistic. The Connally resolution, to say the least, was a tall order, 
ft made difficult demands upon the Spanish people and gave them no idea 
as to how they should carry them out; it lent the opposition no practi­
cal, material assig nee against Franco. Above all, both resolutions 
illustrated an amazing ignorance of the conditions in Spain which pre­
cluded the establishment of democracy. The obstacles to a popular 
rising against Franco were not only political, but economic, social, and 
historical.
To many outsiders it seemed that the Franco regime was a simple 
and monolithic structure imposed forcibly and tenuously upon the people 
of Spain by means of police and government repression. Actually, the 
system was highly complex, composed of several political and institu­
tional "families” that supported It at many levels.8  ^ The army, the
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Church, the ultra-conservative monarchists and the upper classes were 
the main pillars of Francoism; the Falange party and later the techno­
crats were also government mainstays, It was a structure fully inte­
grated into Spanish society; the idea that the opposition could fell it 
with a single blow was far from true. Max Gallo lias noted that it was 
not only the physical strength oi the army and the police forces but 
their real loyalty to Franco which revealed that Francoism wa ' some- 
‘ king othcv than the ephemeral dictatorship of a group or man , . . [It] 
was in fact the political expression of the economic and social situa­
tion in Spain. ” 87 The little opposition that existed witiiln Spain had 
been eliminated or worn down by repression. The anti-Franco forces 
outside of Spain were divided, quarrelsome, and without material support 
"There was literally no social stratum capable of envisaging the replace 
ment of Francoism by a democracy of the Western type, uniting political 
and public liberties, parliamentary government and capital ism, " Gallo 
writes. 88
Franco’s most effective weapon against rebellion was censorship. 
Spanish writer Fernando Vizcaino Casas noted that the problem with the 
U.N. resolution was not that Spaniards would be unable to implement it, 
but that the vast majority of them never read it in full. Only a hand­
ful knew that \ government-in-exile even existed; fewer still knew 
that there was any organized opposition outside Spain. The Spanish 
pretender Don Juan issued a manifesto in 1947 protesting Franco’s Law 
of Succession (a proclamation in which the Caudlllo afpointed himself 
dictator for life), but it was never published by thi Spanish press. 89 
Franco used censorship selectively, so that any outside news that was 
printed could be presented to his advantage.
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Another obstacle to Spain's liberalization was her economic de­
vastation. Following the destruction of her civil war and the isolation 
of the World War, Spain's main concern was sheer physical survival.
The national income in 1940 was equal to what it had been in 1914; the 
population had increased but per capita income remained at nineteenth 
century levels. * Spain was plagued by chronic shortages of elect ri- 
citv, heat, and coal, and the strict system of food rationing gave birth 
to th<‘ "estraperto" or black market. Productivity remained low while 
inflation climbed ever higher. A desperate lack of gold, raw materials, 
manpower ami consumer goods characterized the economy. Reconstruction 
had never real 3v taken place after 1939 — two-thirds of the national 
transport facilities and one-third of the nu rrhant marine had been de­
stroyed In the civil war, ' 1 In addition the policy of autarky, a 
Franquist goal in the thirties and forties, had failed to spawn the 
expected Industrial take-off.
The Spanish economy was starved, literally and figuratively, and 
it seemed as if the masses needed bread more than democracy. While 
Franco's ultimate aim was to win economic aid from the United States, 
it was Argentina who provided his sole support in the immediate postwar 
years. A 1946 commercial agreement between Franco and Juan Pt ron fur­
nished much-needed wheat and foodstuffs. A year later, the Franco- 
Peron protocol extended Spanish credit, facilitating Spain's purchase 
of Argentine consumer goods. Argentina seemed to be the only nation 
that had not deserted Spain, and Spain showed her gratitude by according 
an ecstatic welcome to Peron's wife, Evita, when she visited in 1947.
Eva Perron's tour of Spain was in many ways the climax of the Franco 
regime's campaign against the condemnation of the United Nations.
Fran<o*s response to the 1946 resolution was not meek but defiant; his 
reply to the Potsdam Declaration had been that Spain "neither begs for 
a place* at international conferences nor would she accept one which was 
not in relation to tier history, tier population, and her services to 
peace and cult lire."* Franco warned the U.N. several months later 
that the withdrawal of ambassadors would be perceived as a violation 
of Spanish Independence and an interference in her domestic affairs .
Me admonished that it would only serve to rallv the Spanish people to 
his cause. Spain "would prefer to live in a difficult  isolation rather 
than in a state of incomplete* sovereignty," sniffed the regime’ s o f f i ­
cial replv to the l' . .N .
A massive- protest demonstration in Madrid’ s Plaza de Oriente 
followed the issuance of the 194b resolution. Whether it was really 
" t h e  most spontaneous and clamorous popular manifestation in the his­
tory of the regime" is not certain; skeptics have maintained that 
M«id rile nos were given the day off  work and only attended the rally be­
cause they wanted to keep their jobs. ‘ ‘ In any event Franco’ s speech 
to the giant crowd contained the standard reply to outside criticism.  
"What happens in the United Nations cannot surprise u s , "  the Caudillo 
proclaimed. "With the great force of our righteousness we join the 
tortress of ecu* unitv. With them and with the protection of Hod, 
nothing and no orv can deny our v i c t o r y . " 1'
Contemporary observers have agreed that Franco’ s mobilization 
of Spanish pride and nationalism helped him not to win power but con­
solidate it .  The U.N. resolution had a disspiriting effect on the 
opposition, who had hoped for an ultimatum but gat a moral and symbolic 
gesture in its  place. Jt The members of the Franco government who had
hoped for "evolution" and the eventual replacement of the dictator per­
ceived the revolution a* a defeat for their cause. They believed that 
economic assistance, not diplomatic ostracism, mould have encouraged 
Franco to open the regime. Vizcaino Casas has remarked that "It was 
the United Nations— paradoxically— who assented to and established the 
regime of Franco, This had been anticipated by Churchill, who proved 
to know us a great deal better than the gentlemen of the General 
Assembly."57
In fact, Franco's most important power base was not the national­
ism and pride of the Spanish people but their apathy. The idea that 
the Spanish masses were poised and ready to throw off the yoke of op­
pression is almost absurd, yet the language of the U.N. resolutions 
seemed to assume that this indeed was the case. The exhaustion and 
resignation to defeat of the average Spaniard was a constant theme of 
postwar literature;1^  he found no hope in the political process because 
he had never seen it function effectively. Spaniards "were victims 
of hunger and want, of harsh exploitation by employers and landlords, 
and they found no echo of their day-to-day preoccupations . . .  in pro­
grammes and alms that were too exclusively political," The Spanish 
people did not dream of liberation so much as they
waited resignedly. Whole generations o ’; active men 
had experienced defeat in 1939 and ther repression, 
which had left on them an indelible imprint; the 
cadres of the working class had been systematically 
hunted down. The new generations had not yet reached 
manhood: they were not yet old enough in 1945 to 
fignt.9*
Historically there were few precedents to a successful Spanish 
revolt. In fact, history seemed only to legitimise Franco's victory in
the eye* of the Generalissimo himself. Franco divided Spain into a 
society of victors and vanquished, and the memory of the victory and 
blood sacrifice of the Civil War was the constant theme of his speeches 
and private reflections. The uprising of 1936 was to Franco not merely 
a rebellion but an act of national salvation, and the subsequent fcri- 
umph over the "anti-SpainH gave him his principal claim to power. His 
hold was not tenuous in 194$, for Franco ism was "something more than 
the personal rule of a dictator. Franco gave his r \e to a political 
and social system that was much more complex and adaptable than his ad­
versaries were willing to concede.’'100
The resolution of 1946 was not motivated by bad Intentions, but 
its direct result was to magnify the poverty, isolation, and defiance 
of Franco Spain. It was meant to be a manifestation of the U.N.*s 
strength and unanimity, a decisive decree of displeasure and a moral­
istic mandate for change. In reality, the resolution was the lowest 
common denominator of a divided international opinion— and the show of 
unanimity was temporary. In the first half of the 1940s, the pendulum 
of world opinion had swung away from Francisco Franco. As the decade 
ware on, it would slowly but surely swing back.
Part Two: Rapprochement and Embrace
'There la a desire among Americana, when it cornea to foreign policy*
*° find a single concept* a Commanding Idea* that explains how America 
relates to the world* that integrates contradictory information* that 
eeggaats and rational!tea courses of action* and that* as a court of 
the last resort for both policy-makers and public* almost magically 
Pots an end to disputes and debates,"1
— Daniel Yergin
"Every minute and every day that we hesitate to recognise Spain we 
are merely playing Into the hands of the Communists over the world*"2
— Representative Alvin O'Konski 
(R-WlsconsIn)
January 1950
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No sooner had the resolution of 1946 been passed than American 
diplomats at many levels sought to change It* The American charge in 
Spain| Philip Bonsai, still had high topes that anti-Franco forces 
mould combine to form a moderate government in Spain, one "able to 
steer a course between the reactionary and fascist elements on the 
one hand and on the other the social revolution advocated from Moscow.” 
Nonetheless the feeling grew during 1947 that the resolution was 
doomed to fail. Franco seemed as Intransigent as ever, and the "demo­
cratic" changes made in his government were cosmetic at best.
Careful study of the Spanish problem reveals that 1946 was the 
year of another conflict— that between the anfci~Franeo, Wilsonian 
posture of Dean Acheson and President Truman, and the increasingly 
pragmatic but still minority view of men like George Kennan and James 
Forrestal. This latter contingent advocated not the ostracism of 
Franco Spain but a gradual rapprochement, and hoped that through eco­
nomic, diplomatic, and military channels Spain could be integrated 
into the American sphere of influence.
The story of this conflict unfolded between 1947 and 1950— *the 
years in which Cold War tensions first began to be felt. During this 
three-year period American policy for Spain altered considerably, but 
historians have pinpointed the exact moment of the change at different 
times* In 1965 and without the benefit of access to relevant State 
Department documents, Theodore howl adduced that the official U*S* 
embrace of Franco came in January 1950A  More recently, James Cortada 
set the date at April 7, 1947, when a top-secret telegram from Dean 
Acheson arrived at the British embassy.
According to Cortada, Acheson's telegram contained the "germ" 
of a new American policy which was to lead to store intimate relations 
with Madrid.5 the document expressed the standard objections to 
Franco but also, for the first time* the American suggestion that the
U.S. and Britain agree upon a positive Spanish policy— one which 
"would act as inducement to Spain [sic] elements to bring about another 
form of change themselves and thereby render possible extension of our 
assistance in creating healthy economic and political conditions in 
the country."6 In other words, the United States was rejecting nega­
tive pressure in favor of positive encouragement. Acheson spoke not 
of condemnation hut of closet relations, and looked upon economic and 
diplomatic cooperation as a way to implement change and pave the way 
for Spain's membership in the United Nations.
Also emerging in 1947 was the admission that it would take more 
than an international outcry to force Franco out of power. An increasing 
acceptance of Franco as the "man in charge" was reflscted by charge 
Paul Culbertson, who In the autumn of the year remarked that "this is 
not the opportune moment to develop antagonisms between (the] United 
States and Spain." Echoing a growing sentiment among American and 
British diplomats, Culbertson advised against a State Department attempt 
to "in any way upset applecart here regardless of number of rotten 
apples in cart."7 the implication was that if Franco was rotten, he 
was also the only thing the U.S* had to deal with.
This was a pragmatic and realistic attitude— end one which Ache- 
son did not yet share. The Undersecretary of State still held fast 
to the belief that Franco's presence precluded a change in U.S. policy, 
and thus Cortada is not completely correct In asserting that Acheson's
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April telegram was a turning point in policy formulation. Ache son 
still pushed for the establishment of an interim regime in Spain* one 
that mould hold elections, reinstate civil liberties, and grsat amnesty 
to political prisoners and exiles. As long as Franco remained in power, 
declared the Acheson telegram.
there can be no real Improvement of economic 
stagnation in Spain. We mill continue to be 
blocked from providing the effective assistance 
which would make possible the economic recon­
struction of that country and thereby build an 
effective barrier to civil strife and communist 
domination,8
Acheson suggested that the Americans and British encourage dissidents 
to overthrow the -fascist19 Franco regime, and held that the U.N. reso­
lution of 1946 was still the basis of American policy,
Cortads has stressed that the Acheson telegram la important be­
cause it gives proof that the U.S, policy change came In 1946 rather 
than 1948. as historians had previously believed.9 It can be argued, 
however, that Acheson’s statement constituted no change at all. Be­
cause it repeated the obsolete Wilsonian principles of 1945 and 1946. 
because it showed an unwillingness to accept Franco's government an a
viable bargaining partner, end because it promised American aid only 
under the condition of Franco's removal, the Acheson telegram wee hot 
revolutionary. Proof of an authentic change In policy came only in 
October of 1947. The Instigator was not Dean Acheson hut the Policy 
Planning Staff CPFS) of the State Department, heeded by George F. Kennan.
Kantian himself had long been a proponent of friendly relations 
with Spain, and had told Forrestal that U.S. hegemony in the Mediter­
ranean hinged greatly upon American access to the straits of Gibraltar*10
He considered himself a realise, and had often questioned the efficacy 
of fusing questions of morality with decisions of forelin policy as mall 
as "the carrying over into the affairs of states of the concepts of 
right end wrong* the assumption that state behavior is s fit subject 
for morel judgment."11 It le no wonder* then* that the Kantian staff’s 
policy paper on $pain— a top secret document*— was willing to acknow- 
ledge what Acheson would not.
Essentially the staff paper contained five new elements. First* 
it conceded that Franco remained firmly in power* that hla regime had 
actually been fortified by the demonstration of international hostility* 
and that there was (>no evidence of effective opposition to Franc* 
either within or without Spain* which could bring about an orderly 
change in government." Second* the study declared, United States poll* 
cy of withholding loans and restricting exports to Spain had contributed 
to that country’s economic stagnation. Though the Truman Administra­
tion’* official stance had been to discourage private American credits 
to and trade with Spain* the PPS advised that steps be taken "whereby 
the various controls we have Imposed are quietly dropped* so that nor­
mal trade may be resumed between the two countries." The staff recom­
mended as a third precept that the U.S. ""minimise discussions of the 
Spanish question" in the United nations and even "refrain from any men­
tion of our previous support of the . . .  United Nation* in condemning 
the Franco regime." Where Acheson had previously supported reaffirma­
tion of the resolution of 1*46* the PPS prescribed that it be rescinded. 
George Marshall* the Secretary of State* repeatedly jotted the words 
"I agree" in the margin of the study.*2
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Fourth, the PPS study spoke of Spain's value as a potential Cold 
War ally* It claimed that prior U.S. policy use not in the national 
interest* and had served only to alienate Franco and "operate against 
the maintenance of a friendly atmosphere in Spain in the event of an 
international conflict," The fifth and aost important statement of 
the paper spelled out the direction that future U.S* policy should take, 
"Instead of openly opposing the Franco regime, we should work from non 
on toward a normalization of U.S.-Spanish relations* both political and 
economic*" the PPS proposed, "While no public announcement should be 
made of our views, we should have in mind the objective of restoring 
our relations to a normal basis, Irrespective of wartime ideological 
considerations or the character of the regime in power,"
This final statement is the key, for it contains an open admission 
that Ideology should be secondary to national Interest. The PPS paper 
was a policy milestone, and although it did not reflect a unanimous 
view within the State Department, it illustrated that an increasing 
number of diplomats were beginning to examine the Spanish question in 
s Cold War context. Marshall, for one, gave it his hearty approval, 
although three years would pass before the paper finally became policy.
* * * *
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1947 was a year of many milestones. It was the year of cnmm inlet 
insurgency in Greece* of Marshall Flan aid* and of "The Sources of 
Soviet Conduct" by an enigmatic "Mr. X."13 1947 mas also the year of
the Truman Doctrine speech— the President *s momentous declaration that 
"it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples 
who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by out* 
side pressures."11*
With this statement* Truman had unwittingly implied that it would 
not be the United States* policy to aid peoples who were suffering 
from subjugation by inside pressure. It appeared that America would 
sniy aid "freedom fighters" who were in combat with the left* not 
citizens already conquered by the Right* as was the case In Spain. 
Truman also quite Ironically foreshadowed the eventual rapprochement 
with Franco when he stated that "We shall remain ready and willing to 
join with all nations— I repeat with all nations— in every possible 
effort to reach international agreement."15
Signs that the West was beginning to grudgingly accept Franco 
Spain appeared in November* 1947* after a U.N. resolution to reaffirm 
the condemnation of 1946 failed to win the required two-thirds majority 
in the General Assembly. The New York Times reported that in contrast 
to the heated arguments on the subject the previous year* the 1947 
Spanish debate v*s "short and surprisingly lacking in fire."16 Al­
though the American delegation had kept silent during the proceedings* 
the United States joined a group composed largely of Latin American 
oations (Argent ins * Sras11* El Salvador * Costa Rica, Honduras * Nicara- 
gua* the Dominican Republic* and Peru) in opposing the reaffirmation.
Tho negative American vote was based on the claim that the resolution
of 1946 had failed la Its intended purpose, sad had proved ineffective 
la bringing a change in government to Spain. Officially the State 
Department's stance mss still lukewarm, in spite of the recommendation* 
of the Policy Planning Staff. The Department was willing to relax 
trade restrictions, but would continue to encourage an "orderly and 
peaceful evolution" in the Spanish government with the ultimate goal 
of a "free and democratic regime."*7 There were hopes that the Vatican 
would put pressure on Franco to step down, and the State Department 
promised "scrupulous compliance" with the U.N. ban on diplomatic rela­
tions until he did.
Hints of rapprochement were coming from other quarters. The 
British were inclined to believe that Franco's continuance in power 
was a lesser evil than the chaos and communist influence that would 
follow his forcible removal. Foreign Minister Ernest levin even sug­
gested that the United States and Britain "commence quietly" to enlist 
General Assembly support against further negative action regarding 
Spain* In April 1947, the British recommended that the United States 
formulate its Spanish policy without consulting France, as French 
"prestige" In Europe had declined and the British were suspicious of 
its communist elements. Acheson agreed, and policy became— on an offi­
cial level— cooperative.18 By May of the next year both Britain and 
France had signed commercial treaties with Spain.
Tim crisis atmosphere of 1948 forced many diplomats to reassess 
Spain's value to the West. The Berlin Blockade and the Communist take­
over in Czechoslovakia were two events that accelerated the process 
of treating Spain as a potential ally rather than a pariah. A worried 
Paul Culbertson cabled Marshall from Madrid that while political
objections to Franco had always concerned the American diplomatic corps
more than the militaryt
military considerations in time of crisis may 
well override ideological objections and change 
purely political policy* It certainly looks to 
me as though we are in or very near a time of 
crisis, and X am wondering whether circumstances 
may not soon cause diplomatic thinking to be less 
concerned with ideologies of the Franco brand , * , 
to a point where our present policy may be sort of 
obsolete.19
The question was no longer whether Franco would remain in power, 
said Culbertson, but whether liberalizarAon would be a condition pre­
cedent to any further moves. Indeed, remarked the charge, "with the 
iron curtain daily moving further upstage, the Regime becomes increa­
singly convinced of the correctness of its policies.**20
For one sector of the American public, the question of Spanish 
liberalisation was no longer a question at all. By 1948 a group had 
emerged which advocated not only a change but a complete rehabilitation 
of America** Spanish policy. This "Spanish lobby** sought the reinte­
gration of Spain with the West via military, political, and economic 
agreements. It considered Franco not an obstacle to these goals but 
a prerequisite. According to Theodore Lowl, the Lobby was composed of 
five principal sectors; Catholics (represented by legislators like 
Pat MeCarran and Alvin O'Konski), extreme anti-Cojaaun1sts (who 'Viewed 
Spain as the most zealous anti-Communist nation in Europe and probably 
the only ’reliable* ally in the cause**), a "pro-Spanish bases group*' 
led by Admiral Richard L. Conolly (Most of these men were also Catho­
lics, says Lowl, but "would no doubt have sought Iberian bases re­
gardless of religion"), anti-Trumanists (led by legislators Robert A.
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Taft aiid Owen Brewster), and finally an economic inter#** 
sought the Spanish market for American products (namely, 
cotton). 1
The Spanish Lobby was bipartisan and represented no singlw sbifc- 
tlonal, religions or economic interest—what its members did have in 
common was a desire to incorporate Spain into the American sphere of 
influence, regardless of the ideological character of the franco regime* 
The Spanish Lobby made its international debut in March 1948, when the 
House of Representatives voted Its overwhelming approval of the so- 
called O'Konski amendment. Calling for Spain’s inclusion In the Mar­
shall Plan, the amendment drew shocked protest from all over the world. 
And although a joint committee of the House and Senate rejected it a 
month later, the O'Konski amendment indicated that the Spanish Lobby 
was a force to be reckoned with.
The group's activities were of a highly visible nature in 194t* 
when a string of its members made unofficial visits to franco Spain,
By November six different U.S, delegations had paid calls on Spanish 
officials. O'Konski and Republican Senator Chan Gurney of South Dakota 
arrived in September, as part of a mission to examine the needs of 
United States military forces overseas. Gurney, the chairman of tha 
Senate Armed Services Committee, spent an hour chatting with franco 
behind closed doors while diplomat Culbertson sat patiently in the 
waiting room. When the Senator emerged, he issued a statement favoring 
economic aid to and diplomatic reconciliation with Spain. "Spain is 
the mother country of almost all the Western world," gloved Gurney,
"and it is only natural that the West looks with interest in the re­
vival of Spain that we knew in history. ” 22
to discuss his proposal with Forrestal and the secretaries end
of >ff of the three divisions of the armed forces. Meanwhile, the
forte in 1949, Acheson, now Secretary of State, was grilled! by a Senate 
subcommittee demanding the end to the U.N. ban on ambassadors. In 
July, MeCarran urged the Senate to set aside $50 million in loan funda 
for Spain, to be made available through the Export-Import Bank, Ache- 
son and Truman voiced their unequivocal disapproval of the MeCarran 
amendment, but by August of the following year It would become lav, 
September saw the first official American naval visit to franco Spain, 
when four U.S. warsh'ps called upon the Caudlllo at El Ferrol.
Admiral Rich&rd Conolly had been requesting permission for the
*
naval visit for two yearb , but the State Department bed not glvenhls 
the go-ahead until 1949. Though Conolly claimed to have diecueaed few 
specifics with Franco, he returned to the United States advocating the 
establishment of American naval bases In Spain.23 Conolly*a call on 
the Spanish leader was followed by yet another wave of visiting legis­
lators, including MeCarran and Representative James Murphy. Murphy, 
a Staten Island Democrat, recommended an American loan of $400 to 500 
million to Spain* After meeting with the Caudlllo, he told the press 
that Franco was a “mild-mannered man with an interest in and a greap of 
world affairs,"' Murphy found the Generalissimo to be “a very, very 
lovely and lovable character,1,2**
The objectives of the Spanish Lobby were threefold} to establish 
an American military presence in the peninsula, to arrange for U.S. 
loans to bolster an unstable Spanish economy, end to promptly restore
Congressional advocates of an alliance with Spain redoubled thalr ef*
diplomatic ties In order to facilitate the attainment of these f ■. 
two goals. The Spanish Lobby’s efforts were lauded by Connally 
Vandenberg, who in 1949 urged a "nonpartisan" foreign policy on all 
issviou. "Disunity or serious division on a political basis in the 
United States greatly weakens our band abroad," Connally urged in De­
cember. ^ 5 Vandenberg articulated the growing sentiment that the dip­
lomatic isolation of Spain was an inconsistency of American foreign 
policy— recognition of other nations did not hinge upon American approval 
of their regimes. Yet the Initiative to change Spanish policy must 
come from Achesm  and Truman, said Connally, and until it did tha Lob­
by’s cause would be stymied.
Or would it? The President and the Secretary of State might 
withhold supporti hut the Ameri;*n military was a powerful behind-the- 
scenes patron of the pre-Spanish cause. It waa true that the Air fttMfr- 
and the Army saw Spain as a low priority in 1946, but when the Soviet# 
detonated an atomic bomb in 1949, bases in Spain were deemed imperative, 
The Navy, for its part, had long been aware of American weaknesses in 
the Mediterranean and Atlantic— and believed that British bases in Gi­
braltar, Malta, and Egypt should be matched with neighboring American 
establishments. According to Lowl, American naval strategists feared 
"being bottled-up in or sealed-out of the Mediterranean," and needed 
bates in Spain as a bargaining chip in the fight for control of the 
Mediterranean Sea, Indeed, Spain seemed ideal for naval bases— its lo­
cation provided access to two oceans, its large army would provide 
a surrogate for American troops, and no new construction would be nec­
essary.26
Secretary of Defense Forrestal, a former Navy man himself, was 
also a proponent of American bases in Spain, Forrestal was especially
concerned that the United States have access to Middle East oil reserved* 
and considered Spain a vital link to the Mediterranean,27 In 194S he 
sent two officers to discuss the possibility of a loan to Spain with 
W. W. Aldrich, head tf the Chase National Bank. The loan was intended 
to finance Spain's purchase and installation of modern air equipment 
for its three largest airfields— but if questioned the Office of Euro* 
pean Affairs would state that it favored the loan "in the interest of 
promoting safety in international aviation."28
Thus, the fear of a negative public opinion forced even the mill* 
tary to proceed with caution. The European members of MATO were averse 
to Spain's inclusion in that alliance; this too prevented an overt at* 
tempt to draw Franco into the Western orbit* Military higher-upa found 
themselves caught between loyalty to the President— who staunchly op* 
posed any agreement with Franco— and a conviction that Spain's strategic 
potential should not be wasted. As a result, says Lowi, a symbiotic 
relationship developed between Congress and military underlings. The 
latter provided Congress with "data and cogent arguments, and Congrats* 
in turn, provldtd them with protection and encouragement."28 Congress*
men met with Pentagon officials to plot strategy, and the fragmented 
Spanish Lobby gradually coalesced into a group that was capable of 
"embarrassing" the State Department into action.30 The final assault
Many barrier* prevented an easy embrace of Franco Spain$ one was 
opposition within the State Department. By 1948 the Department was 
Willing to concede that "a broadly free and democratic regime is both 
almost unknown in Spanish history and Impossible of attainment at any 
time in the near future,"31 and that the normalization of relations 
was among American desiderata. Yet a hesitancy to approve economic or 
military aid to Franco remained. Public opinion, both in the U.S. and 
Western Europe, constrained State Department policy; the military could 
go whole hog on bases, but diplomats knew no such luxury* When the 
question of ambassadors resurfaced in the United Nations in April 1949, 
the State Department advised that the American delegation abstain from 
any vote. Although the 1946 resolution had been "a departure from 
established American practice that the accrediting of an Ambassador 
does not signify approval of a government and is of course inconsistent 
with our maintenance of Ambassadors . . • beyond the Iron Curtain," the 
U.S. delegation was again counseled against even bringing up the Spanish 
question in the General Assembly.32 Acheson felt that the most accept* 
able tactic was to build up the popularity of the United States with 
the Spanish people in order to secure "full cooperation in the event of 
e possible war." Spain's membership in NATO, the Marshall Flan, or MAP 
was st ill out of the quest ion. Economic assistance might eventually 
be possible, suggested the Secretary of State, aa a means of "popular*
1 xing" the United States in Spain. But such aid would be approved only 
if it gave Franco no cause for "antagonism or undue complacency."33
A second barrier to rapprochement was the very existence of the 
1946 resolution. Marshall had publicly voiced U.S. willingness to sup* 
port its repeal in 1946, but British and French foreign ministers
Ernest Bevin and Robert Schuman persuaded him to drop the idea when 
the three met in Paris. Though he preferred the repeal of the ban to 
its repeated violation, Marshall was forced to advise against American 
initiation of a change. In May 1949, a group of Latin American nations 
introduced a resolution which stated that the ban of 1946 had *>een a 
failure, and that members of the U.N. should be free to conduct relations 
individually with Spain. Neither the Latin American resolution nor a 
Polish proposal to reaffirm the guidelines of 1946 was able to win the 
two-thirds majority necessary for adoption.
Quite simply, Franco was still a "politically undesirable aaeoci- 
ate."3'4 Though the Western military favored an alliance with Franco, 
Western governments considered these designs ae a political impossi­
bility, In 1949 the New York Times expresssd the widespread opinion 
thar "Franco is not only a bad credit risk. Be is a bad moral risk 
. . . However much we might sympathise with the Spanish people we aft 
not called upon to aid the mean and vindictive little men who now 
rules them*"35 In a press conference held during the General Assembly 
debate over the .Latin American resolution, Acheson reaffirmed his con­
viction that Franco's was a fascist and dictatorial regime. He pro­
tested the lack of civil liberties in Spain end repeated that It waa 
Spain's responsibility alone to get "back into the family of Weatarn 
Europe." Acheson reminded his audience that his views represented offi­
cial American policy— a policy which was "calculated to please neither 
group of exfcremista in the United States— either those who say that we 
must immediately embrace Franco, or those who say that we must cast him 
into the outermost darkness."36 His statement surprised and diaplaaasd 
Franco, and the issue of Spain stayed on the back burner in tht U.N.
until the following year.
The Acheson-Truman obstacle was perhaps the most fo raid able barrier 
to a change in relations with Spain. The President's opposition to a 
policy change was colored by his belief that Protestant Minorities were 
mistreated in Spain, as well as a personal dislike for the dictator 
himself. Truman made no secret of his distaste for the regime, remarking 
in 1947 that "There isn't any difference in totalitarian states, I 
don't care what you call them— Ha*i, Communist, or Fascists, or Franco, 
or anything else— they are all alike . , . The police state is a police 
state," repeated the President, "I don't care what you call it."37 Tru­
man consistently refused to give his approval Cor Congressional Junkets 
to Spain, and frostily told the press in 1949 that Senator McCarran had 
visited Franco "on his own. He represents nobody in the Government of 
the United States except himself."3S
Throughout 1949 and 1950, however, pro-Spanish pressure mounted 
from every quarter, making it increasingly difficult for Truman and Ache- 
son to hold their ground. "Our official encouragement to liberalise 
and change is completely neutralised by the attitude and statements of 
such people as Senator Taft and Senator McCarran," complained Culbert­
son from Madrid. "Are we, in the face of the views of Senators Connally, 
Vandenberg, and others . . . going to maintain our position of abstention 
on the question of the return of ambassadors to Madrid?" Culbertson 
had written to Acheson in June 1949 with the advice that tha United 
States abandon Its attempt to "base policy on the concept of molding the 
rest of the world in our own democratic image." Arguing that "peoples 
the world over are not the same and won't mold the same," the charge 
contended that the Spanish needad economic, and not political, reforms*
"The refusal of material aid to Spain punishes the Spanish people, 
not Franco and his cohorts or the rich,1* Culbertson maintained. “There 
are lots of very hungry people in Spain today, and there are going to 
be more before the end of the year."39
When NATO was formed in 1949, Spain had been excluded by general 
consensus. The political character of the Franco regime prevented its 
membership in an organisation which was pledged to the defense of the 
“freedom, common heritage, and civilization" of its peoples as well 
as "the principles of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of 
law,"1*0 The Office of Western European Affairs issued s statement in 
Apr il 1950 which declared that as long as NATO * s policy was based on 
the concent of “strengthening and safeguarding democracy) and not 
merely on a negative reaction to Communism," it would be difficult to 
envisage Spain as a partner in the organisation’s “collective effort*"**1 
Nonetheless the American Joint Chiefs of Staff advocated Spanish par* 
ticipation in NATO, by means of the application of U.S. pressure upon 
the NATO countries who objected to Spain. In the absence of NATO ap­
proval the Joint Chiefs supported a bilateral military agreement with
Spain.**2 By May 1950 they had collaborated on NSC-72, a very crucial
policy paper which recommended that the United States immediately bring 
Spain into its orbit. “In the light of the worsening world situation," 
the document began,
and the likelihood that the North Atlantic Treaty 
countries could not, now or during the next sev­
eral years, defend France and the Low Countries 
successfully in event of Soviet attack, the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff consider it of paramount impor­
tance that the United States and its allies take 
proper steps to assure that Spain be an ally in 
event of war.**3
Spain’s neutrality, warned NSC-72, would not be enough to protect the 
Allies in the alt age. If the Soviets trampled over Prance and the 
tow Countries as the Germans had in previous wars, Spain would serve as 
"the last foothold in Continental Europe for the United States and its 
a l l i e s M i l i t a r y  arrangements with Spain were to be made without de­
lay, for any hesitation would "cause a decrease in Spanish ability to 
resist ar. enemy attack."4*k
Truman’s reaction to NSC-72 was that it was "decidedly militar­
istic and in my opinion not realistic."4*6 The state Department ob­
jected that "A purely negative anti-Communiat policy could not possibly 
command the popular support, or stimulate morale to the eame extent, 
as a positive program of mutual cooperation to support and strengthen 
the western democracies." NSC-72 undercut the concept that NATO members 
were to consult and agree upon all relevant courses of action, said 
the State Department, and an agreement with Spain would cast doubt on 
the Americancommitment to strengthening the democratic— and not just 
the anti-Soviet— nations of the world.4*6
Despite these protestations, the Congress and pro-rapprochement 
press continued to clamor for action. Representative John Kee cham­
pioned the cause of Spanish recognition in a speech to the House on 
January 9, 1950. "If a regime has the power to govern, It is a govern­
ment," argued Kee. "Recognition is a neutral thing. It should imply 
neither approval nor disapproval of theregime receiving it."1*7 The 
Washington Post agreed that the question of diplomatic recognition 
should not be "weighed according to the theoretic merits or defects of 
the form of government • • • but solely according to its advantages or 
disadvantages in the present state of world affairs."1*8 For the
Washington Evening Star the issue of recognition was not a matter of
practical concerns so much as duty: "In one breath we proclaim our
greatness and our moral principles. And then we stultify ourselves by 
refusing to stand up and be counted on a clear-cut Issue which bears 
not only on our own integrity but on the integrity of the U.N. as well.,,M9
Acheson acquiesced on the question of recognition in January 1950.
In a letter to Senator Connelly the Secretary confessed that the United 
States had long questioned the ♦'wisdom and ef fleecy” -of the recommenda­
tions of the 1946 resolution. Admitting that the resolution had failed 
in its intended purpose, Acheson called the withdrawal of ambassadors
a ♦♦mistaken departure from established principle,” but although the U.S. 
was prepared to vote for a rescinding of the 1946 resolution, such a 
vote would not signify American approval of the franco regime. Finally, 
Acheson stated an American desire for economic relatione with Spain, 
for increased trade, U.S. investment and the extension of credits for 
specific projects. The Secretary closed his correspondence with a 
Wilsonian flourish, encouraging the Spanish regime to take "steps toward 
democratic government which offers the best hope for the growth of 
banie human rights and fundamental freedoms in Spain.”50
For many, diplomatic recognition was not enough. The Spanish 
Lobby** raison d'etre wss not the symbolic but the material assistance 
of Spain; its members wanted to send U.S. dollars, escorts* and mili­
tary aid to franco in addition to an American ambassador. Their goal 
was not Spain9s mere acceptance in the U.N.— they fought to support 
and ally her with the West. "While we are fighting communism on all 
fronts," wondered one Congressmen, "why do we neglect this opportunity 
to give recognition to a nation which is so uniformly against communism?”5*
If war broke out against the communist nations, continued a Senator, 
no nation could remain neutral. "We would be foolhardy Indeed and 
plain foollah if we did nor seek now and in the near future to coordi- 
nate and integrate the capacity of Spain with that of other nations 
in the North Atlantic community* To all intents and purposes,0 he con* 
tinned, "Spain is a huge airfield surrounded by water."5? Ho location 
would be more valuable than Spain In bringing about the ultimate defeat 
of an aggressor, predicted another Senator, for she was "put there as 
If by the Almighty.” ’3
The February 1949 loan of $25 million to Spain by the Chase Bank, 
the Acheson letter favoring recognition, the passage of the MeCarran 
amendment in August 1950— these were all victories for the Spanish Lobby. 
Although Truman would later attempt to block the $62.5 million loan to 
Spain which the McCarran amendment had provided, the battle was essen- 
tlally won. The only remaining hurdle was the U.H. resolution, an ob­
stacle fairly easily overcome. "The resolution will be repealed if we 
want it repealed, maintained if we want it maintained," remarked a cyni­
cal Hew York Times.5I* The Times saw in Acheson1 • struggle with the 
Spanish question the Image of a man "resolutely carrying a load of hot 
coals as long as he could and then dropping them In a mixture of dis­
gust and relief." By 1950 it no longer seemed worthwhile to the Admini­
stration to face controversy over a stale and relatively unimportant 
issue, the newspaper claimed,55 and Acheson dropped the coals in March 
when he disclaimed the desirability of going "from one country to another 
with a piece of lltmue paper * * . trying to see whether everything i« 
true blue, whether the political, economic, and social climate is 
exactly, in all its detail, the kind that we would like to have either
On November 4, 1950, the General Assembly voted to revoke the 
resolution of 1946, and gave its  blessing for the return of ambassadors 
to Spain to any member nation which desired i t .  Much of the text of 
the original resolution remained (including the statement linking Fran­
co with the Axis and the recommendstion that the regime be replaced 
with a democracy), hut thirty-eight nations including the United States 
had voted to allow Spain's inclusion in U.N. agencies. The power to 
name an ambassador remained with Truman, who claimed to have "nt thoughts 
on that idea at a l l .  It is going to be a long, long time before there 
is an Ambassador to Spain,M the President told the press, "and you w ill 
have plenty of time to think it  ov er ,"57
Truman's "long, long time" turned out to be about six  weeks, On 
December 11 It was announced that Stanton G r iffis—formerly the Ameri­
can ambassador to Egypt, Poland, and Argentina—wouId represent the 
United States in Franco Spain, The President's explanation for the 
appointment was that there had been "no change in policy with regard 
to Spain, except that we need an exchange of ambassadors which makes it  
a l i t t l e  more orderly way to do business with the two governments."
And though Truman's attitude toward Franco "hadn't changed a b i t , "  he 
confessed to G riffis  that he had been "a l i t t l e  overruled and worn 
down by the Department."58 By February of the following year, the 
United States as well as Britain and France had exchanged ambassadors 
with Spain. Franco had been in power for a dozen years, and within 
that time American policy had come fu ll c ir c le .
"I was asked by every Congressman and v is itin g  newspaperman i f  
American aid to Spain was not in rea lity  d irect aid to Franco and the 
support o f Franco,11 recalled G r iffis  in his 1952 memoirs, "There can 
only be one answer to this question, and that was unequivocally yes. 
Franco was Spain,"r>* It seemed to make l i t t l e  d ifference in the 1950s 
whetlier American a ll ie s  were true democracies or not; indeed, as Sena* 
tor MeCarran would remark, Americans could no longer be independent o f 
those of whom it  disapproved, "We announce we won't deal with the un­
couth, and discover, with a two a.m. toothache, that the only available 
dentist beats his w ife ," was McCarran’ a analogy,<0
The 1950 revocation of the ban on ambassadors was, for Franco, 
a moral victory. It seemed to vindicate the d ic ta to r 's  steadfast anti­
communism as well as his long-held conviction that the West "needed" 
Spain. Franco1* courtship by the United States certainly came as no 
surprise to the Spanish leader; he had predicted as early as 193# that 
the West would eventually orient its  policy towards Spain due to a 
"geographical imperative,"61 Above a l l ,  the United States1 embrace 
bore out the popular legend that Franco*s chief occupation was trans­
ferring papers from one box to another on his desk. The f ir s t  box was 
labeled "Problems Time Will Solve," and the second— MProblems Time Hm 
Solved."62
Franco had not altered the character of his regime except super­
f i c ia l ly ;  the taw of Succession declared that Spain was a monarchy 
but also that Franco was to rule Spain until his death. The referendum 
to confirm the Law of Succession was a national joke, an event one 
c r it ic - in -e x ile  called a "heads 1 win, ta ils  you lose" s itu ation .6  ^
Franco was confident o f his own survival, and knew it  would be only a
61
matter of time before the United States accepted his regime* *111 see 
that the greater part of world opinion has come, even i f  It w ill not 
admit I t 'e x p l ic it ly ,  to adopt an ideologica l line which Spain has been 
maintaining for thirteen years," said Spanish foreign minister Artsjo 
in 1948. (,i* Once the ideological "adoption" took place, there was no 
need for the Spanish to court the West.
When examined within the context o f early Cold War events, the 
seemingly sudden American embrace of Franco hardly needs an explanation. 
Arthur Whitaker has observed that the United States approached Franco 
when Cold War tensions superseded that ideologica l concerns o f World 
War It , A more exact assessment is  that one ideology—that o f the na­
tional security state—replaced another—that o f  self-determ ination— 
in the late 1940s and 1950s. And while Theodore towi has written that 
the policy  change towards Spain resulted from the e ffo rts  o f the Span* 
ish Lobby, i t  is important to note that i t  was the prevailing anti­
communist mindset which moved the Spanish Lobby to action. Some h is­
torians have hailed the embrace of Franco as a triumph of the new Ameri­
can rea lp o lltik . lut while the Spanish policy  o f 1950 was more prag­
matic than it s  forerunner, i t  would be wrong to say that its  anti­
communist origins were synonymous with p o lit ica l "realism ."
The repeal o f the 1946 resolution had at least one cru cia l, 
long-term consequence— it paved the way for the 1953 Fact of Madrid, 
in which Franco granted the United States bases in Spain in exchange 
for economic and m ilitary aid. The Fact Vs s ign if icance l ie s  in the 
fact that i t  was a s tr ic t ly  b ila tera l agreement; in making i t  the 
United States both bolstered and defied the NATO nations who wanted 
no part of a m illtary alliance with Spain. The United States courted
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Franco without the consultation or approval o f  Great Britain} the 
two nations* previous cooperation on Spanish a ffa irs  was another casu­
alty of the postwar r i f t  between then.
The decision to fora a working alliance with Spain did not, by 
any means, m et  with unanimous American approval. The jigw York Times, 
enti-Franco to the fin ish , believed that even diplomatic recognition 
would strengthen the Caudillo 's hold "at a time when slight cracks were 
beginning to appear.*'65 Salvador de Madariaga spoke for thousands of 
Spaniards when he complained that the Western powers had presented 
Franco "with a moral victory on a silver p la tte r ."  He warned the Gold 
War "rea lis ts " that Franco had not fought for Hitler and would not 
fight for them.66
Madariaga's admonitions were disregarded. Americans in 1150 per* 
ceived Communist expansion as a greater threat to democracy than to­
talitarianism in general; indeed, the concern for the preservation o f 
a " fre t"  world had given way to  an emphasis upon the security o f the 
"non*Communist" world. The utopian and illu sory  goals of the Connally 
resolution f e l l  victim  to the practical considerations o f containment, 
yet both approaches to foreign policy  have survived. The implications 
of their survival deserve discussion.
Part Three; Relations with Franco 
and the American Foreign Policy Character
"Consistently, throughout our h istory, we have assumed that we have 
a message for the world, a democratic message, and, some would say, 
a message o f redemption* Consistently we have scanned the horison, 
looking for signs that the message was being received. Hopefully 
we have attempted to convince ourselves that other movements were 
In trin sica lly  at one with our own, despite loca l d ifferences or 
complexion . . . " l
—David Potter 
People o f  Plenty
"A p o lit ica lly  mature people should be able to understand and evalu­
ate accurately, in a foreign statesman, a kind o f intelligence that 
is  cra fty , a sincerity  that is  fanatic, a tenacity that is  ruthless, 
an integrity  that is  cruel. A p o lit ica lly  mature people . . « should 
rebel against the cheap argument that any foreign p o lit ica l leader 
challenging or denying their way of l i f e  must, simply by view o f his 
intransigence, be a pervert or a freak."2
—Emmet Hughes 
Report from Spain
The United States1 policy  for Franco Spain provides an excellent 
example of how two seemingly con flictin g  philosophies— id ea lis t ic  
Wilsonianism and "r e a lis t ic "  and pragmatic anti-Communism—-were applied 
to a single situation during a relatively  short period o f time. When 
dissecting the period as a whole! i t  becomes apparent that Spanish 
policy  was a microcosm of a generally d u a listie  U,S, approach to for* 
sign relations, Amsrican pollcy-aakers mixed idealism with realism in 
Spain and in many nations during the transition  from World War to Cold 
War. Inspecting the "two strands*1 of American foreign policy  in the 
context o f Franco Spain is  a valuable exercise principally because it  
reveals a great deal about the postwar American diplomatic "character" 
— that set o f traditions, idea ls , assumptions, and perceptions which 
have shaped the American view o f the contemporary world.
Dubious Indeed is  the assumption that one o f these influences 
upon policy-maker* was more desirable than the other; both can be 
cr it ic ise d  for a variety o f reasons, The Connelly resolution, which 
was the embodiment of the Wilsonian approach, has hypocrisy as a pri­
mary flaw. The entire discussion of Spain in the U.N. violated that 
organization*• own charterr Spain was not Invited to the debate Which 
concerned her and non® o f her replies to the accueations made against 
her were taken seriously. Franco*s must vocal detractors in 1946 
were the Soviet Union and the Eastern-bloc countries—and their exclu­
sion of Spain because o f it s  repressive and unrepresentative regime 
was a case o f the proverbial pot calling the kettle  black. The Connally 
resolution demanded a string of prerequisites for Spain*s membership 
in the U.N. which a good number o f the member nations were themselves 
unable to sa tisfy .
American policy  was based on the illusory  hope, that democracy 
would "evolve" in Spain, but i f  the State Departaent had heeded the 
warnings o f it s  own men on the scene, perhaps i t s  goal’) would have been 
a b it more r e a lis t ic . Carlton Hayes, the American ambassador to Madrid 
during the Second World War, had long c r it ic is e d  o f f i c ia l  U.S. policy  
toward Spain. "Obviously, in the opinion o f our government, the choice 
for Spaniards was to starve to death or revolt against their govern* 
ment," recalled Hayes. His objection  to the 1946 condemnation of Franco 
was that i t  reversed the traditional American stance o f non-interference 
and indicated policy-makers* "colossal ignorance" o f Spanish a ffa ir s  
and h istory . 3 Hayes had always recommended that the United States 
accept Franco as the head o f the Spanish government and give up hoping 
that the regime would collapse spontaneously at the war's end. "The 
memory o f  the horrors o f the late Spanish C ivil War is  much too v iv id , 
and the fear o f doing anything to precipitate it s  recurrence, is  with 
the exception o f the Communist minority, almost a national obsession ," 
wrote Hayes in 1946. **
Similar caveats were expressed by William W. Butterworth, the 
American charge in Spain during 1946. "There is  no more likelihood o f 
obtaining in Spain by sudden means a representative and democratic 
govt [ s i c ] ,"  Butterworth cabled Byrnes, "then there is  o f wiping out 
by fia t  the bitterness engendered by 3 years of c iv i l  war." Butter­
worth also warned the administration against joining the U.N. condemna­
tion o f Spain, because by Indulging in a public denunciation in one 
year the U.S. would t ie  its  hands for the next severa l.5
Impervious to the warnings o f diplomats, the administration con­
tinued it s  attempt to shake Franco out o f power by using "nothing mors
lethal than a d je ctiv es ."6 The m oralistic, self-righteous, and often 
arrogant language o f resolutions on Spain was a sign o f the times in 
the Immediate postwar years; President Truman's 1945 Navy Bay Speech 
bore a typ ica lly  Wilsonian stamp. "The foreign policy o f the United 
States is  based firmly on fundamental principles o f righteousness and 
jn s t ic e ,"  he avowed* "In carrying out these principles we shall not 
give our approval to any compromise with e v i l . "  Truman solemnly 
pledged "to  bring the Golden Rule into the international a ffa irs  o f 
the world * . . to pursue [our] course with a l l  the wisdom, patience, 
and determination that the God o f  Peace can bestow upon a people who 
are trying to fo llow  In His path ."7 Apparently the American president 
had chosen to ignore the God o f Peace's recommendation that Christians 
judge not do as not to be judged,
Connally himself had somewhat pompously explained that although 
the Spanish people were barred from U.N. membership, he would be happy 
to provide them with an inventory o f "the conditions which they them­
selves must create in order to remove these obstacles" to their entry.8 
But i t  was Bean Acheson who best articulated the moral exigencies o f  
American postwar policy  with the remark that "We are w illing to help 
people who believe the way we do, to continue to live  the way they 
want to l i v e . " 9 When the Spaniards were ready to prove their worthi­
ness of American aid, they would receive i t —but iron ica lly , most 
Spaniards never knew about the demands being made on them. Even when 
the resolution o f 1946 was rescinded, the average Spaniard was not 
aware that Spain was s t i l l  barred from U.N. membership and that the 
censorious preamble to the resolution o f 1946 s t i l l  remained.*0 The 
l i f t in g  o f the ban bn ambassadors was met neither with popular jubilation
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nor euphoria In the Spanish press— indeed, Spaniards cook the news 
serenely and as I f  they had quite conftdently awaited i t . 11
So much for m oralistic expressions o fin tern a tion a l disapproba­
tion . But can the American policy  which replaced the m oralistic con­
demnation o f Spain be accepted without criticism ? Certainly the United 
States approached Franco more amiably because it  perceived a Soviet 
th reat/ but was thisRuesophobia re a lis t ic ?  Some historians have 
viewed America's attempt to shape an alliance with Franco as part o f 
a calculating and confident new re a lp o lit lk . but the fact remains 
that disagreement and confusion charac: ^rised even Cold War p olicy  
changes.12 Accepting Franco as an a lly  presented many with a aarious 
moral dilemma» and some Americans asked themselves whether the e n d -  
security—ju stifie d  the means in the embrace o f Franco, Darien, Chiang 
Kai-shek and T ito. "Should we accept m ilitary aid from any * njrce 
on the ground that the defeat o f commonism must be the primary concern 
o f our national p o licy ?" wondered the Saturday Evening Post in 1951.13
Apparently, the answer was yes. Senator MeCarran interpreted 
Spanish history In a whole new way when he wrote that that nation 's 
c iv i l  war was simply "S ta lin 's  f i r s t  European inning in a game whose 
subsequent innings were played and won in Poland, Yugoslavia, Czecho­
slovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, and China, and whose latest 
Inning is  Korea." According to McCarran, the United States was destined 
to go from the Grand Alliance to a "strange a llia n ce ,"  made up of 
"S ocia list British, ex-enemy Ita lians, Monarchical Norwegians, Falan­
g ist Spanish, Republican French, possibly ex-enemy German." The 
alliance would be redeemed, however, by the n ob ility  o f ite  common 
purpose: "the containment of Russia, the spawning bad o f the moat
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vicious p o lit ica l  form in the hi«tory of man's search for the good 
s o c ie ty ,"1*4
If i t  seems hypocritical o f  the U.S. to have supported a d ic ­
tator only four years after ca llin g  for his fo rc ib le  removal, i t  must 
also be remembered that Americans, i f  forced to choose between right* 
wing totalitarianism  and left-w ing revolution, have on the average 
spoken In favor o f the former,15 Allowing the continuance o f  Franco's 
reactionary rule seemed a lesser ev il to permitting S ta lin 's  revolu­
tionary expansion, and i f  the battle  against communism was to be waged 
on every fron t, then the Iberian peninsula seemed strateg ica lly  and 
economically suitable* The Spanish Lobby never asked i t s e l f  whether 
bases in Spain would stop the Soviets; i t  simply assumed that their 
virtue as a deterrent was obvious and that aid to Franco was money 
w ell-spent«
Whether the "Spanish people" welcomed the American m ilitary 
and economic presence in Spain was immaterial| their actions had 
been of c r it ic a l  import m m  in 1946 but their opinion in 1950 wae 
mot so lic ited  or co*- idered necessary* Spanish lib erty , which he4 
imperative four years ea r lier , was W O  6 dated teeue, 
tfceh American i^tvv-mmhets found a Commanding Idea, they stuck to ft 
steadfastly**^* a  least until a better one cam  along<
• I i *
"Attitudes and opinions toward foreign policy questions are not 
only to be understood as responses to objective problems and situations, 
wrote Gabriel Almond, "but as conditioned by culturally imposed quali­
ties o f  character."1**.. Not only has the American national experience 
o f  World Ww\r and Cold Wnr given js  a unique and lasting world view, 
but both the American rejection and embrace of Franco reveal many traits 
of our foreign policy "personality."
The f ir s t  set o f tra its  fa lls  under the "Wilsonian" heading, a l­
though Woodrow Wilson is  most closely  associated with American idealism 
because he articulated it  rather than invented i t .  As the Second World 
War drew to a close  * Wilsonian idealism permeated every expression o f 
America’ s postwar aims. Many believed, l ik e  Harry Hopkins, that the 
peace meant "the dawn o f the *;ew day we had a l l  been praying for and 
talking about for so many years ."17 This Idealism was not the a r t i f i ­
c ia l creation o f p o liticia n s but part of the outlook o f an entire 
populace. In 1946 about 93 percent o f Americans approved o f the idea 
of settling  disputes in an international organisation, and 69 percent 
renounced the iso la tion ist notion that the U.S. should "keep to i t s e l f  
and not have anything to do with the rest o f the w orld ."18 A sense of 
mission and a sense of gu ilt drove Americans to the conclusion that 
they must take the lead in the formation o f an International organisa- 
cor their failure to do so after the First World War seemed to 
have led to the disasters o f  the Second*19 Such an organisation 
mould not only atop aggression, but would encourage the spread o f eco­
nomic prosperity and democratic ideals. Senator Connelly believed that 
the United nations Organisation was "(b ]o lder than the ideas of Kent, 
Roussaau, and other philosophers who devised utopias . . . i t  is  even
more substantial than the hopes of i t s  modern father, Woodrow Wilson, 
and his follower, Franklin D. Roosevelt.”20
Henry Wallace shared Connelly*s enthusiasm for the United Na­
tions, and saw the organization as a form in which the United States 
could exercise both its  moral and m ilitary leadership to press for 
peace, prosperity, and democracy.21 Though he did not always mention 
Spain sp ecifica lly  as part of the world's ’’slave" half, Wallace in­
cluded Franco in his condemnation o f the "Quislings, Lavals, and Musso­
lin i sM who believed in "one Satan-Inspired Fuehrer" and thus had to 
be eliminated. 2 Not only anti-Francoists but a large sector o f the 
American public believed that it  was the United States* duty to wipe 
Franco like a blot from the p o lit ica l landscape, but once the war had 
ended they stipulated that it  must be done without endangering the 
p e a c e .3
The crusade against Franco had a huge appeal in 1944 and 1945, 
but as the Cold War progressed the more militant o f anti-Franco Ameri­
cans were not praised for their idealism but were often accused o f 
being Communists. "As far as the FBI and the right wing were con­
cerned, it  was a ll right to be anti-Fascist once i t  became acceptable," 
wrote one historian, "but to have been antl-Fasclst too soon, say, to 
have supported the Loyalists against Franco was tantamount to being 
a Communist and, thus, d is loy a l."214 Similarly, lib era ls  like Wallace 
seemed to have held on to militant anti-Fascism for just a l i t t l e  too 
long in the late 1940s and early 1950s, and for their refusal to f o i i t  
the Hitler analogy upon Stalin and to support a foreign policy ch ie fly  
motivated by anti-Communism made them the object o f almost constant 
suspicion.25
That Americans in 1945 believed democracy must b#» regenerated in 
Franco Spain reveals the missionary quality of their character* gut 
Aaer leans greatly unde rest I mated the d iff icu lty  of the taait, and thin 
illustrates yet another i raffle flaw of the After lean foreign poliev com­
plexion. Almond has wr itten that the AwerIc an la
an optimist i»a to ends and an improviser as to 
mean*:* The riches of his heritage and the mo­
b il ity  of his social order have produced a gen­
erally  euphoric tendency, that is ,  the expecta­
tion that one can by e ffo r t  and good w ill achieve 
or approximate mu*' > goals. '
Americans have never believed in the long-term planning of foreign 
policy objectives, Almond continues, and the Idea o f
taking the "long view," acquiring su fficien t 
re1lable inf ornation on whIch sound polley can 
be baaed, weighing and balancing the potential 
value of m ilitary, p o lit ic a l ,  diplomatic, and 
psychological means in relation to proposed 
courses of action . . . has hardly taken root 
in the American policy-making process.? 7
In short, the United States pursued a policy  o f "democracy on deftand" 
in Spain, believing that the virtue of the ideal was enough to spur 
the Spanish people to Implement a change.
Countless historians have written of the missionary character 
of the American approach to foreign relations; David Potter In his
c la ssic  People of Plenty described the phenomenon with particular under­
standing* "We continued to hope that American liberty  could go abroad 
F.nd s t i l l  remain liberty  as we knew her," wrote Potter* Americana 
have often seemed so convinced of the moral authority o f their 
of equality, freedom, and opportunity that they have believed that
"fo r  every aristocrat who disparaged us or condescended to us there 
were scores o f plain men and women who shared in and were heartened by 
our aspirations for human welfare • . . (andl that the heart o f human­
ity  responded to the creed of our democracy."28
According to another historian, the tendency to believe that 
people across the globe wanted democracy emerged from the "common-man 
myths" of the American depression years* "The image of virtuous and 
decent l i t t l e  people fighting for their lives and integrity  against 
predatory forces" was one of the most appealing ideas of the depression 
and i t  continued to be popular not only in the war years but in peace­
time, to o .2<3 Americans wanted to think that even "Chinese Communists 
were, at bottom, Jeffersonian democrats who mouthed the thoughts o f the 
independent agrarian man," Potter observed.30 It is no wonder then, 
that the ideal of a liberal and democratic Spain died hard among the 
American people.
Why have Americans—as in the experience with Franco Spain—so 
often been disappointed in their mission to spread democracy? Potter 
theorised that Americans think they have democracy becausa they ahoae 
i t —but in reality  i t  exists because favorable economic conditions 
permitted its  growth. The fa llacy  that a nation can "choose" democracy 
"has consistently impelled us to proselyte for converts to the demo­
cratic  faith In places where the economic prerequisites for democracy 
have not been established." P otter's theory applies accurately to 
Spain in the 1940a, which had neither the p o lit ic a l ,  h is to r ica l, or 
economic foundation for democracy, American sty le . Nonetheless the 
United States deepened its  alienation o f Franco Spain by blaming the 
Spanish for " fa ilin g  to embrace the p o lit ica l ideals which our standard
o f  liv in g  support s . " 31
. :*:4
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William Appieman Williams has attributed the failure o f the V*v-
a
American mission to the choice o f  tactics employed by the missionaries!
Even i f  the American way were the only e ffe ctiv e  approach to govern* 
ment, Williams argued * "the act o f forcing it  upon the other society— 
and economic and p o lit ica l pressure are forms o f force—viola tes the 
idea o f self-determ ination," Our humanitarian urge to assist other 
peoples is  undercut, and even subverted, by the way we have gone about 
helping them, Williams claims. 37
Robert Osgood has written that American idea lists  have been d is -  
appolnted over the years because they have made the mistake o f “con­
fusing what was ideally desirable with what was practica lly  atta in ab le ."33
i i
Jipfl?
According to Osgood, Americans often have had good intentions in foreign 
policy  but
have never been consistently true in their Ideals 
i f  the translation of those ideals into rea lity  
has required an important sa crifice  o f the national 
se lf-in te re s t , as they have conceived i t .  America, 
like a l l  other nations, has acted with positive and 
responsible Idealism only when the great mass o f  
the eitisenry has been convinced that ideals and 
se lf-in terest coincided .34*
Perhaps the key to Osgood’ s assertion is that America is  like any 
other nation in its  hesitancy to pursue id ea listic  goals, unless i t  
is  clear that this pursuit coincides with the national interest.
But particularly American Is the tendency to leaven a l l  self-in terested  
p o lic ie s  with moral sentiment; Indeed, writes Osgood, the ideals ex­
pressed in the traditional American mission have been as important 
to our sta b ility  in foreign relations as strategic in terests .3S
A final reason for the fa ilure o f the American mission, and 
especia lly  for its  miscarriage in Spain, is  the fact that Americans 
have a strong tendency to identify every country's revolution with its  
own* Because the American is  a self-made man, he expects others to 
be so, too.** If the thirteen colon ies could shake o f f  the yoke of 
oppression in 1776, armed with encouragement and moral rectitude other 
nations could do so as well. Issues in 1945 particularly seemed to be 
simple matters o f black and white, good and e v il ,  slave and free . 
According to the Atlantic Charter, freedom and self-determination 
"were synonymous and . . .n o  people, therefore, should be denied the 
right to in d e p e n d e n c e ; Franco may have been "one of the most v i­
cious enemies o f the American way o f l i f e  and American in te rests ,11 
but his eradication would convert Spain Into a land "as secure and 
friendly, as hard-working, and hard-fighting as America i t s e l f * " 38
Self-determination—this was the ideal. Yet self-determ ination 
was a tricky matter after the Second World liar, for  i t  appeared that 
the American defin ition  of freedom to choose a government was freedom 
to choose Western-style democracy. State Department o f f ic ia ls  had 
long frowned upon the Idea of even allowing a restored monarchy in 
Spain—and i f  Spaniards had overthrown Franco to create a Communist 
government, the United States would not likely  have called it  " s e l f -  
determination."
Yet victory would have meant l i t t l e  i f  the p o lit ica l conditions 
which had spawned the totalitarian regimes o f the 1930s had remained 
in existence, observed John Gaddis, and Americans were "conditioned 
by wartime rhetoric" to expect a peace settlement that would restore 
democracy everywhere.39 They fe lt  that i t  was their responsibility
to create a peace which would embrace the entire world—for Wallace
■ ■■. . . .  . ' ■■■■■■
the price o f a "free world v ictory " was that the citizen  had "the su­
preme duty o f sa crific in g  the lesser Interest for the greater interest , 
o f the general welfare. ,|{*° In his now-famous Farewell Address, George 
Washington had warned that only American Isolation  from foreign con­
f l i c t s  would enable her to pursue a "d ifferen t course," But the policy ­
makers o f the postwar world found America's salvation in international­
ism, and the spreading of American p o lit ica l  ideals, economic institu ­
tions, and m ilitary protection across the world* While Washington had 
opposed permanent alliances and the entanglement of American peace 
and prosperity with a corrupt and self-in terested  Europe, the inter­
nationalists believed in a global American mission which would embrace 
Europe as a common and permanent partner.
American Idealism about Spain Indeed revealed a great deal about 
the United States' foreign policy  personality* But i f  idealism  is  a 
tra it which can be traced to our ea r liest or ig in sv then the pragmatism 
which replaced i t  is  a more recently  acquired characteristic, th is  is  
not to say that American policy  became self-in terested  for the f ir s t  
time in IMS, Yet it  is  true that the perception o f the Soviet Union 
a;' a permanent threat to American interests became part o f our set o f 
foreign policy assumptions in the immediate postwar years. The other 
side of the coin o f Spanish policy  was the diplomacy o f anti-communism, 
as we have seen in the examination o f o f f i c ia l  statements, policy  pa­
pers, and public speeches.
Historians have given many names to the emergence of anti-communism 
as a sine que non o f American foreign policy . Arthur Schiesinger saw 
the phenomenon as a victory o f 'spheres-of-in fluence" thinking over
"universalism ." Kenneth W, Thompson analyzed the question an one o f 
Churchtlllan realism versus utopianism. Daniel Yergin has pinpointed 
the change as the result o f the triumph o f the "Riga axioms" among
policy-makers over the "Yalta axioms." Nearly a l l  agree, however,
that the "shaky peace" experienced since the late 1940s has been based ~
upon an often clumsy combination o f the two,1*2
It would seem that Wilsonian universalism and Kennanesque anti­
communism make for somewhat strange p o lit ica l  bedfellows. Yet both 
tra its are quintessentially American, and were embodied unmiatakably 
in Senator Connally, for example. Connelly was an ardent supporter 
o f the U.N. and believed i t  would greatly promote International s ta b ility  
but an equally important component o f his philosophy was that the So­
viet Union had a "dream of world conquest'1 and was "the biggest problem 
facing the free world today."1*3 Dean Acheson*e idealism wee undeniable, 
but the same man who swore loyalty to the ideal o f " s t r ic t  compliance" 
with U.N. guidelines also remarked that "we cannot avoid the fact that
force w ill  play a great part in the grand strategy o f creating a work­
able non-communist world system,"**1* Arthur Vandenberg and Harry Tru­
man also displayed this id e a lis t -re a lis t  dualism.
To say that anti-communism "replaced" idealism in the formulation 
o f policy  towards Spain is  perhaps not a completely accurate assessment. 
No American politician  could have to ta lly  abandoned universalism, for  
to concede that the world was divided into spheres o f Influence would 
have meant the betrayal o f the principle o f self-determ ination—a prin­
cip le for which many Americans believed World War II had been fought.**5 
The solution was to synthesize universalist principles with spheres- 
of-in fluence strategy and state that American interest? would be served
best by supporting Franco. A policy  motivated solely  by anti-communism 
was unpalatable to most Americans, but i f  i t  could be demonstrated that 
American ideals were protected by supporting Franco, then the embrace 
of the dictator could be rationalized. "Europe without American strength 
and leadership can neither preserve its  own independence nor foster an 
international system in which anyone1s Independence m ill survive,"
Ache son argued.*40 The security of the United States was made to seem 
dependent upon the security of Europe, and to exclude Franco Spain from 
the Western alliance was tantamount to leaving "a broken link in the 
chain o f defense around Russia to the West.” 07
Winston Churchill had for many years supported an Allied extract 
o f Franco. As early as 1944 he expressed his hope that Spain would be 
a "strong influence for the peace o f the Mediterranean after tbs 
Churchill saw Spain's p o lit ica l problems as a matter for the Spaniards 
themselves to work out, and in 194§ k* told  the Commons that time had 
passed since the condemnations o f Potsdam and the itest should rscogttia* 
that i t  now had a "d if fe r e n t  relationship” with Moscow. He publicly 
urged Spain's inclusion in the United Nations, and privately hoped for 
a m ilitary agreement as w e ll.1*8
As Kenneth Thompson has noted, Churchill's outlook often ran 
against the prevailing p o lit ica l  tides of the day.09 If the British 
leader had no moral qualms about an alllance with Franco, i t  was be­
cause for him, moral questions were not simply "a choice between right 
and wrong but a choice between lesser e v i l s A m e r i c a n s  at f ir s t  
may have had some trouble adapting their own world view to this Machia­
vellian  philosophy, but the Pact o f Madrid signalled the ultimate ac­
ceptance of Churchill's "lesser e v ils ” ideology* A decade before the
Fact o f Madrid* Roosevelt had ju s tifie d  the United States' wartlee 
alliance with Stalin as a case o f crossing a bridge with the devil 
until safety was reached at the other side, When the Soviet Union 
became the enemy, Americans crossed the bridge with Franco, who was 
just one o f  a la rg e  assortment o f seemingly Satanic companion**
America's relationship with franco was redefined when* as Yergin 
has written, national security against the f m in t  threat became the 
Commanding Idea of U.S. foreign policy* When security is  the primary 
objective of a nation 's diplomacy* Yergin has theorised*
desirable forcing policy  goals are translated in­
to issues o f national survival, and the range of 
threats becomes lim itless . The doctrine [of na- 
tional security] is characterised by expansiveness, 
a tendency to push the subjective boundaries of 
security outward to more and mere areas* to ell* 
compass more and more geography and more and more 
problems. It demands that the country assume a 
posture o f  m ilitary preparedness; the nation must 
be on permanent a le r t .5*
Keeping Vergin'a defin ition  in mind, it  become! apparent that i t  matters 
l i t t l e  whether Spain was actually the strategic "gem" and "la st fo o t­
hold" of Me stern lurope. The point is  chat American o f f i c ia ls  par** 
ceived her to be so. Shoring up Spain economically and m ilita r ily  
meant securing the Iberian peninsula as part o f the American sphere 
of influence,
The word "secu rity11 had crept stea lth ily  into the American for­
eign policy vocabulary. Carlton Hayes was an easy convart to the 
creed of national security* and the ex*afisbasaador confessed in the 
19508 that "sorry experience since 1945 has taught us that Communist 
Russia is bent on world domination and that IS a far more dangerous
threat to our security than Germany ever was,"5 Even Culbertson 
agreed by 1950 that "world security" was not improving, " I f  Spain 
has any value in that secu rity ," the charge remarked, "we and the 
other powers o f the West should get away from emotionalism and study 
the Spanish problem from a practica l, even se lfish , point o f  v iew ."53
Yet the components o f the national security doctrine were not 
merely ideological and strategic. Economic considerations played an 
important role in uhe rapprochement with Franco, as revision ist h is­
torians have so ardently argued. The State Department saw economic 
sta b ility  in Spain as a prerequisite for her p o lit ica l and m ilitary ad­
vancement, and feared the chaos which would result from depression more 
then any Soviet invasion of the peuinauli, Spain also represented 
a tteW market for U.S, exports and investments, and accompanying every 
loan to Franco Spain was a demand that she open up to foreign cap ita l. 
Indeed, the revisionists would have had a fie ld  day with Stanton G r if f is 1 
speech to the American Chamber o f Commerce in Spain:
The government of the United States has stood, 
since Its inception almost two hundred years 
ago, as the champion o f private enterprise . , . 
we are hopeful that many o f the restrictions 
now applied to American business operations 
can be ameliorated or removed. We hope that 
American corporations may be encouraged to make 
Investments in Spain through permission to ob­
tain larger interests in Spanish companies than 
is  now allowed. I,h
There is  some va lid ity  to the revision ist argument that the 
United States embraced Franco as part of a desire to plant the seeds 
o f free enterprise In yet another ready and fe r t ile  f ie ld . Joyce 
and Gabriel Eolko have expressed ju stifia b le  d istaste for the alliance
of American democracy wit It Iberian authoritarian!**. Yet the Kolkoa* 
contention that It was the United States' aim to "restructure the 
world so that American business could trade, operate, and p ro fit  with­
out restriction s everywhere" is  somewhat extreme. Completely false 
is  their claim that "on th is there was absolute unanimity among the 
American leaders, and it  was around this core that they elaborated 
their p o lic ie s  and programs.**1fS The io lliis  have also written that the 
United States essentially  traded its  own recognition and aid for Span­
ish raw m aterials, disguising economic motives behind an anti-Communist 
f a c a d e . B u t  we have already seen that America's Spanish policy  grew 
from a very rea l—albeit confused—p o lit ica l idealism, as well as 
the perception of Spanish bases as a strategic necessity. The Ameri­
can desire to enact a global New Deal existed to an extent, but the 
Congressmen who wanted an alliance with Franco pointed to a map o f 
Europe and not a balance sheet.
In any event, studying the change in American relations with 
Spain reveals the newer attributes of our foreign policy personality.
A pervasive b e lie f in a Soviet threat, coupled with the conviction 
that national security must be the principal objective o f  American 
diplomacy, are an integral part of our policy  character today. Whether 
they w ill remain so Is yet to be seen, but at the time of th is w riting, 
anti-Communism—as much as Wilsonian idealism— is  alive and well and 
liv ing  in Washington. A discussion o f the legacy o f America's p o li­
c ies  toward Franco Spain is reserved for the concluding pages.
Conclusion
H0ood intentions h«m* rarely sufficed either to constitute a sound 
foreign policy or to justify its indictment."1
—Emmet Hughes
To study Spanlsh-Aaerlean relations during the early Cold War 
is in many inspects, as we have said, to study the United States* 
approach to diplomacy in many parts o f the world. The moral dilemma 
posed by the alliance with Francisco Franco was not a new one; Ameri­
cans had befriended d ictators before and after their embrace of the 
Spanish leader. That Spain was suddenly perceived as a strategic 
bulwark against communism should also come as no surprise; since the 
1940s the United States has defended tiny nations from Southeast Asia 
to Central America as "final footholds" of American security. What 
then is  the unique legacy of the United States* policy in Spain?
Can a special lesson be drawn from the American experience with Fran* 
cisco  Franco?
The answer, o f course, is yes. Perhaps the greatest lesson o f 
the failure of America's 1946 condemnation of Franco comes from Ache- 
son's statement that moral condemnations o f a regime are not only 
dangerous, but more often than not, fu t ile , Thm*gh an attempt to ban­
ish Franco from power, the United States resolution served only to 
increase his intransigence and consolidate his power. When the Ameri­
can policy  about-face came a few years la ter , Franco was not grateful 
but complacent. He had waited for the world to change and come back 
to him, and by 1910 i t  appeared that much o f the world had done s o .2
The question o f Spain's real strategic value remains today a 
hypothetical one, and the American bases in Spain may never be more 
than a potential, and not a provable, asset. The Issue that must be 
addressed is  not whether the Pact o f Madrid was worth the monetary ex­
pense, but whether making th is "p a ct with the dev il" meant that Ameri­
ca 's  security was ultimately more important than p o lit ica l or moral
considerations. Many Americana would like to believe that Franco’ s 
death marked the end o f an era in Spanish history which is  best fo r ­
gotten. Yet Spaniards cannot forget Franco’ s rule any more than they 
can erase nearly forty  years o f their national h istory. The American 
bases in Spain—as well as Spain’ s tenuous membership in NATO—are to 
many Spaniards an unwanted legacy o f the Franco years. To a growing 
number of Spaniards the bases are not a source o f security but one of 
disquiet, and serve as a constant reminder of the dictatorship which 
made their p o lit ica l and strategic decisions for them for almost four 
decades.
To some extent the United States’ Spanish policy  can be excused 
because o f the r -pid change and confusion which characterisedthe era 
in which it  was made. Cold War historians have remarked that coherent 
and consistent policy-formulation could not exist in the mid~1940s, for 
the American p o lit ica l culture had become "too complex, the spectrum o f 
coupeting Interest groups too wide, ami the number o f novel issues 
too great.” 3 The advent of the atomic bomb, the problem of Germany, 
the formation of the United Nations and the administration o f the Mar­
shall Plan seemed to deserve more immediate attention. That Spanish 
policy  was lo s t  in the shuffle is  thus neitktr surprising nor unfor­
givable. And although some o f tin  e ra ’ s "best and brightest” d ip lo ­
mats helped to forge the policy towards Franco, i t  nonetheless was 
almost destined to he a casualty o f  the more monumental concerns which 
took precedence over i t .  Franco’ s designs for Spain Indeed seemed 
insignificant when compared with S ta lin ’ s aims for Eastern Europe, 
and even i f  diplomats aad given their fu ll attention to Spain it  Is 
doubtful.that their thinking would have been completely clear* gemmae
aptly summarized the essential problem of the time in a 1950 diary
entry:
‘ ever before has there been such utter confusion 
in the public mind with respect to U.S. foreign 
policy . . /They a ll  wander around in a labyrinth 
of ignorance and error and conjecture in which 
truth is  intermingled with fiction  at a Hundred 
points, in which unjustified assumptions ha at* 
talned the va lid ity  o f premises, and in which there 
is no recognised and authoritative theory to hold 
on t o .1*
The chaotic foreign policy climate of the late 1940s goes far to 
explain the defic ien cies  of United States* policy  for Spain. Yet in 
spite of this confusion, the criticism  that American policy was too ex­
treme must s t i l l  be made. Extremely id ea listic  were the United States9 
continued proclamations that democracy must be restored in Spain. The 
anti-Communist policy which supplanted them wee also undesirable, for i t  
completely Ignored Idealism in the interest of American security -at- 
any-price, Spanish historians have observed these extremes b itte r ly , 
ca llin g  the 1946 resolution ’'spectacular and Ineffective" and attributing 
Franco's fin a l consolidation o f power to the policy  epelled out in ttS€~ 
72.5 In dividing the Spanish problem into a question o f good versus 
e v il ,  the United States only reinforced the societal cleavage between 
v ictors and vanquished which had begun after the Spanish C ivil War*
The tragedy o f America*s Spanish policy is  not that Wilsonian 
idealism and fervent anti-Communism existed, but that the growth o f 
the latter led to the practical Im possibility o f  carrying out the goals 
o f the former. In embracing Franco to protect their own security, 
Americans iron ica lly  demonstrated that democratic principles had to be 
denied in Spain In order that they could be preserved In the United
$
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States. Perhaps the greatest irony is  that democracy fin a lly  came to 
Spain In spite o f ,  and not because o f ,  American e ffo rts  in its  behalf. 
The death o f one nan—Franco—and the p o lit ica l  maturity o f the Spanish 
people ultimately succeeded in restoring democracy to Spain where the 
proclamations, condemnations, and isolation  of the rest o f  the world 
Had failed*
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About the Bibliography
Of tha primary sources listed belong the most frequently con­
sulted "imtm undoubtedly ihi State Department * • Foreign Re la t Ions of the 
United States, As my main concern was with the details of policy for* 
mulation— especially who was responsible for suggesting changes and 
when these changes came— I found this series to be indlspensibie, 
the Hew York Times provided a more multi-dimensional view and extensive 
coverage of developments in Span!sh-Amerlean relations in the late 
1940s, Truman*s Public Papers were a helpful source of his public 
statements on Spain (which, incidentally, mirrored his private opinions 
as well) and also of his more faious speeches. The State Department 
Bulletin filled in gaps when Foreign Relations *:*s not complete, and 
the Congressional Record was replete with speeches and editorials on 
Spain and Franco, The speeches especially enabled ms to contrast the 
views of the anti-Franco liberals with those of the Spanish Lobby,
Official Spanish records of the policy-making process were, not 
surprisingly, unavailable. The few documents to be found ware somewhat 
homogeneous $ that is, th,y all gav* Pranco'■ official stataaanta to 
proa* and public hut provldnd llttl. Insight Into tha private workInga
of hi* alulatrlaa. Tha aouresa iiatad It  tha bibliography ar, 
eolleetiona of Praaeo'a «?*a«hta.sad vrltiage ®* politics, govan«aa«, 
« d  iotaraatloiial relations..; Jpaainh aawg^para wwm oot' miltfcS* to 
» t hub contaapotary hiatorlcal works provide aoau rapriata of nawa 
attic lea*
Perhaps the first point which must be made about the secondary 
sources is that tha time of tha research period and the required length
98
of the thesis Halted the bibliography to those sources which seemed 
most directly related to Spanish-American relations daring the late 
1940s* or to Cold War history* These can be separated Into three 
groups! Books or memoirs by people on the scene* monographs on various 
aspects of American Cold War policy by contemporary authors* and gen­
eral surveys of the period by Spanish and American historians* A fourth 
snd smaller group of secondary sources included those vhich theorised 
about the nature of the American foreign policy character.
Of the first group* Hayes' memoirs were most valuable* for they 
contained not only a summary of the history of American relations with 
Spain but a valuable perspective as to why the American policy was des­
tined to fall. Acheson scarcely mentions Spain in his memoirs* but 
his theories on international relations and American internets are still 
pertinent today. Connelly and Vandenberg have left volumes which are 
excellent portraits of both themselves and the period in which they 
lived*
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The secondary sources on Cold War history include both those volumes 
which reinforce the most widely accepted views of contemporary historians 
(Vergin'* Sh*tt*r«<l Popes. Gaddis' Jjgt United St«f* and thji Oriaina ft 
the SfiMStiLi }«t*r*M*a to i w »  Haiti an* m m  of thalass-sopportod ''V 
opinions aa wall (th* Koikes' M w l f t  iff Power. Cerdntr'a Archltaota of jl 
lli-Baloo. -Willlaoa'' Ttaaady of toatloan M i l w a n l , I thish ie aaa 
accessary to give coosldaratloa is both aata of iriwptttti, a* bath waff 
applicable to tba altuatlon with Spain. Of th* Spanish and Aoarican 
•urvey* of tha period, I found Cortada'a works to b* axtrmaly balpful 
and concise. Any dlscuasion of the condeanation of Spain would have 
basa inccaiplats without tha cnatributions of fool sad Cart
§ ||fi
iM ifi "t
m m
I f 2 M
d* la dictadura a la deaocracla)» and the writings of Madariaga and 
Biescas and Tunon de Lara reminded me that tha American embrace of 
Franco was not universally appreciated in Spain, the books and arti­
cles in the bibliography which I have not Mentioned served functions 
similar to the ones described abovet although 1 must make special 
Mention of Lowi's "Bases in Spain/1 which gave a very comprehensive 
account of the activities of the Spanish Lobby between 1948 and 1953*
Bibliography
Documents and Newspapers
Dias-Flaja, Fernando* La posiuerra eapanola an sue documentos* Bar­
celona, 1910.
Franco Bahamonde, Francisco* Franco ha dlcho, Madrids 1948,
* Filahras del caudlllo* Madrid» 1943*
________ • U l M l  4* doctrin* politic*, mdrld, m i ,
se.m m nsa* *diti<m* b*t«*«& i m a  »»<i 1 9 5 1 .
0*9. C*o*T**». Cow*r*»*lo«>*l — tori. 1944-1950.
‘‘SJSSSfJ.T'i!!*!** ~  ^ B s s ss  ^  m u  liiMji m *
.. D »parf«nt o f Stat* Bulletin . 1945-1950.
lag ton, SM galtld StetMp 1995-1950. Hull-
Book*
:: ifcfe-th»
_ _________ . Power and Diplomacy* Cambridge, Maes., 1958,
Aabrose, Stephen. Rise to Globalism. Menasha, Wisconsin, 1976,
Blescas, Jose Antonio and Tunon de Lara, Mamiel. Espana hajo la dicta* 
dura franqutsta. Barcelona, I960.
Binney, Horace. An Inquiry into the Foraation of Washington*a Fare* 
well Address, New York, 1969,
Carr, Rayaond. Modern Spain, 1875-1980. Oxford, 1980.
Connaliy, Ton with Alfred Steinberg. My Name Is Toe Connelly. New 
York, 1954, ..
Cortada, Janes. A Bibliographic Guide to Spanish Diplomatic History, 
1460-1977, Westport, Connecticut, 1977,
__________editor. Spain in the Twentieth Century World, Westport,
Connecticut, 1980, — «*—
. Two Nations Over Tlnat Spain and the United State*, 1776- 
1^77. Westport, Connecticut, 1978.
Cottrell, Leonard S. and Sylvia Eberhart. Anarlean Opinion on World 
Affairs In the Atonic Age. Princeton, IllB.
Council on Foreign Relations. The United States in World Affairs 1945* 
1947. New York, 1947, . ^ r
Divine, Robert A* Second Chancet 
Anerica During World Iter II.
y ^ t o U M t l o i i U i i  in
Vu«l( Juan Pablo and kaynoad Carr. l anana. da 1.  dictadur. .  u  * w -  
c n t li . garctIona, 1979. ................. -
<*Uo, Max. Spain Ond.r francoi A Wl.tory. Nov York, 197*. 
Gardner, Lloyd C. Archlt.ct. of Ulualon. Chicago, 1970. 
Grlffla, Stanton. Lying In State. Carden City, Haw York, 1952.
Nayaa, Cavlton J.H. Ifee flnltad fr a f*  and Spain. Woatport, Connncti- 
cvit, 1951.
Wsyes, Carlton J.tt. Wartime Mission.in Spain* Saw York, 1948,
Keitnan, George F. Awerlean Diplomacy. Chicago, 1951*
Kolko, Joyce and Gabriel. The Limits of Power. New York, 1972.
Malar, Charles, editor* The Origins of the Cold War and Contemporary 
. Mew York, 1978.
Mea, Charles* Meeting at Potsdam* New York, 1975*
Millls* Waiter, editor* The Forrestal Diaries. New York, 1951.
Osgood, Robert* ideals and Self-interest in America^ Foreign Re la- 
t ions. Chicago. 1*553*
Paterson, Thomas* On Every Front. New York, 1979. 
letter, David. Peopie of Plenty* Chicago, 1954.
Rose, Lisle. After Yalta* New York, 1973.
Russell, Ruth. The History of the Uni ted Nations garter* Washing­
ton, 1958.
Schieidman, J. Lee. Spain and Franco, 1949-S9* New York, 1973.
Smith, Gaddis. The American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy
New York , W T *
Thompson, Kenneth. Winston Churchill's World View. Raton Rouge, 1983
Truman, Harry 8. Mr. Citiien. New York, 1980.
.. .,r._..» Year of Ssclslcng, Mew York, 1915,
.^.&  ifi£ ***** ' City, Me* York, 1958*
&•* / The el
Roston, 1998 ♦
Vi*c*ino C*h *. taTMwto. u  teWBM 4*. . t o  go.KU.rr* i 1939-1933 
iarcelona, 1975,
W.lk*r, J. SmiMl. Sjarx Wall.t* *n4 Aa«.rlc,a Fot.Un Policy. 
Waitport, Conn*cticut, 197,.
Wallace, Henry A. Th. C.ntury of tha Comoon Haa. N.v fork, 1943. 
Wal^R. Uck*rd J, j u t *  Will***. Harry Trwwn. and th* Cold Iter
K Vmmik 9^ J 11 - ~~ esmspm emmmpmwt* mqpnppmiIWrOf - . . ,  ^ .• , . •
Whitahet, Arthur. Spain and Dttense o f fg »  itest. Nev Tofts, J,i§l* 
Williams, William Appleman. The Tragedy o f American Diplomacy. Hew
Yergln, Daniel. Shattered Peace. Boston,
Articles, Essays, and Pamphlets
Almond, Gabriel. ’’American Character and Foreign Policy” in The Char- 
actor of Americans, edited by Michael McGiffert. Homewood, Il­
linois, 1970.
Asearate, Pablo de. Spain, Past and Future. London, 1945.
Hoisted, Charias. "Spanish Foreign Policy, 1916-1978" in Spain In
tho Twentieth Century World, edited by James Cortada. Westport, 
Connecticut, J.9S0.
Jimenez Quelez, Manuel. Wheels wlthin Wheels} How Russia Uses United 
Rations Against Spain« Washlngton. 1947.
Lange, Oscar. The Problem of Franco Spain. Washington. 1946.
Lowi, Theodore. "Bases in Spain," in American Civil-Military Decisions, 
edited by Harold Stein. Birmingham, Alabama,1963.
Madariaga, Salvador de. "The Anatomy of tht Cold War," lectura deliv­
ered in Queen’s University, Belfast, April 21, 1955.
McCarran, Pat. "Why Shouldn’t the Spanish Fight for Us?" Saturday 
Evening Post, April 28, 1951.
O fflca  o f Information, Spanish Embassy, Tht Spanish Question Before
| M  S|j||Aggygai M  5 Btrgfli. r t ln t t r m t i im i lM , lfiS5£. -
•ch lM lm iT, Arthur, Jr. "Origin, p i th« Cold H»r.B A ffa ir .. :
